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I. INTRODUCTION 
The developed world has made much progress in improving so-
cial conditions over the last several centuries.  Safe and plentiful food 
and water, while once a daily struggle to achieve, are now significantly 
easier to come by.1  Technological advancements have made access to 
medical care more readily available to the masses.2  Both in Europe 
and in the United States, times have changed and societies have re-
sponded by innovating with new and beneficial legal constructs.  But 
no matter how far modern society progresses, there is one social 
problem that it seems no society has gotten just right: housing.  Al-
most every major economic player on the globe has faced a self-
described housing crisis in the last seventy-five years, and many of 
these are perceived to continue even today.3  Although housing crises 
may take many forms, they often manifest themselves as shortages of 
 ∗ C.E. Laborde, Jr. Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University, Paul 
M. Hebert Law Center.  I thank the Southeastern Association of Law Schools and the 
organizers of the Texas Junior Legal Scholars Conference for the opportunity to pre-
sent and receive commentary on this Article at their 2007 meetings, as well as the 
LSU Law Center for its generous research support.  I am also grateful to N. Gregory 
Smith and Vernon Palmer, whose insights were invaluable, and to Brandee Ketchum 
(LSU Law Center Class of 2008), who provided excellent research assistance. 
 1 Recent efforts in global sanitation resulted in a ten percent increase in areas 
with access to safe water, giving over 1.2 billion additional persons access to clean wa-
ter in 2004.  See generally UNICEF PROGRESS REPORT: A REPORT CARD OF WATER AND 
SAFETY (2006), available at http://www.unicef.org/media/files/Progress_for_Child 
ren_No._5_English.pdf. 
 2 See THE WORLD HEALTH REPORT 1999, HEALTH AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE 20TH 
CENTURY 6 (1999), available at http://www.who.int/whr/1999/en/whr99_ch1_en.pdf 
(attributing more than half of the gains in public health from 1950 to 1992, includ-
ing declines in infant mortality and disease, to technological advances). 
 3 See, e.g., VALERIE KARN & HAROLD WOLMAN, COMPARING HOUSING SYSTEMS 143–
44, 148 (1992) (describing housing crises in the United States and United King-
dom). 
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available and adequate housing, particularly in the rental market.4  
Rental housing shortages then lead to a whole host of other societal 
problems, including, at the extreme end, homelessness.5
Public concern over housing issues has reached an all-time high.  
Perhaps the most telling recent example comes from the French 
struggle to solve its housing problems.  In early 2007, a group of pro-
testers referred to as “Les Enfants de Don Quichotte” (“The Children of 
Don Quixote”) set up a tent city in one of Paris’ most vibrant areas.  
Those involved were protesting the state of the housing market in 
France.6  And they were not all homeless.  Even some of the social 
elite of France came out, albeit temporarily, to support the dream ad-
vocated by Les Enfants.7  In response to such an undeniable outcry for 
action on the housing situation in France, the government detailed a 
proposal to “create a legal right to housing.”8  A bill that went before 
the French parliament in March, 2007 proposed a legally enforceable 
guarantee of safe and sanitary housing for all.9  On March 5, 2007, the 
bill passed, making France only the second European country (be-
hind Scotland) to guarantee such a right.10
 4 Id. at 148. 
 5 See Curtis Berger, Beyond Homelessness: An Entitlement to Housing, 45 U. MIAMI L. 
REV. 315, 321–24 (1990). 
 6 French PM Vows to Help Homeless, BBC NEWS, Jan. 1, 2007, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6227237.stm [hereinafter French PM Vows]; see 
also John Ward Anderson, Tent Cities Across France Stake Claims for the Homeless: Chirac 
Promises A Right to Housing, But Doubt Remains, WASH. POST, Jan. 11, 2007, at A22 (not-
ing promise by then-presidential candidate Nicolas Sarkozy that, if he were elected, 
“no homeless people would be on the streets of Paris in two years”). 
 7 French PM Vows, supra note 6. 
 8 Law No. 2007-290 of March 5, 2007, Journal Officiel de la République Fran-
çaise [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], March 5, 2007, p. 4190, available at 
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr (follow “Les autres textes législatifs et réglementaires” 
hyperlink).  The law guarantees the right to “decent and independent” housing to 
any permanent French resident if the resident is not able to provide or maintain 
such housing by his own means.  Id. 
 9 Id. 
 10 The Scottish Executive appointed a task force in 1999 to make recommenda-
tions on remedying and preventing homelessness.  HOMELESSNESS TASK FORCE FINAL 
REPORT, HELPING HOMELESS PEOPLE: AN ACTION PLAN FOR PREVENTION AND EFFECTIVE 
RESPONSE (2002), available at http://www.scotland.gov.uk/library3/society/htff.pdf 
[hereinafter HELPING HOMELESS PEOPLE].  The task force’s report grew out of the 
principle that “everyone in Scotland should have dry, warm, affordable and secure 
housing[, which] . . .  is . . . crucial to family life, physical and mental health, child 
development, employability and the creation of sustainable communities.”  Id. at 1.  
As a result of the 2002 report, the Executive enacted The Homelessness Act of 2003.  
The Homelessness (Scotland) Act, 2003, (A.S.P. 10).  The Act extends the right to 
housing to all homeless persons.  Id. 
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The French development is an interesting one, particularly in 
light of the fact that a multitude of European jurisdictions seem to 
sympathize with the sentiment behind it.  France may be one of the 
only countries to governmentally guarantee housing, but at least nine 
European countries have declared it a fundamental right held by all 
mankind.11  Even across the Atlantic in the United States, the notion 
that adequate housing is a core right is taking hold, though certainly 
more slowly than it has in Europe.12
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the French movement is 
that, if the government guarantees housing, it must then implement 
that plan.  How is this guaranteed housing to be provided?  Not sur-
prisingly, the French plan provides only scant detail about the vehicle 
 11 See, e.g., BELG. CONST. art. 23 (“Everyone has the right to lead a life in confor-
mity with human dignity. . . . These rights include notably . . . the right to have de-
cent accommodation . . . .”); FIN. CONST. § 19 (“The public authorities shall promote 
the right of everyone to housing and the opportunity to arrange their own hous-
ing.”); 1975 Syntagma [SYN] [Constitution] 21 (Greece) (“The provision of homes 
to those who are homeless or live in inadequate housing conditions shall be the sub-
ject of special care by the State.”); Gw. [Constitution] art. 22 (Neth.) (“It shall be the 
concern of the authorities to provide sufficient living accommodation.”); PORT. 
CONST. art. 65 (2005) (“Everyone has the right for himself and his family to a dwell-
ing of adequate size satisfying standards of hygiene and comfort and preserving per-
sonal and family privacy.”); CONSTITUCIÓN [C.E.] 47 (Spain) (“All Spaniards have the 
right to enjoy decent and adequate housing.”); REGERINGSFORMEN [RF] 
[Constitution] 1:2 (Swed.) (“It shall be incumbent upon the public administration to 
secure . . . housing and education, and to promote social care and social security and 
a good living environment.”); HELPING HOMELESS PEOPLE, supra note 10, at 1 (noting 
the Scottish view of housing as “crucial to family life”); Law No. 89-462 of July 8, 
1989, Journal Officiel de la République Française [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], 
July 8, 1989, p. 8541, available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr (follow “Les autres 
textes législatifs et réglementaires” hyperlink); see also Jane Ball, Renting Homes: Status 
and Security in the UK and France—A Comparison in the Light of the Law Commission’s Pro-
posals, CONV., Jan.–Feb. 2003, at 38–60 (recognizing the French right to housing as a 
fundamental right).  For international agreements recognizing a fundamental right 
to housing, see Universal Declaration on Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 25(1), 
U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948), available at 
http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html (“Everyone has the right to a standard of 
living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including . 
. . housing . . . .”); International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, 
G.A. Res. 2200A, at 11(1) (Jan. 3, 1976), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/ 
menu3/b/a_cescr.htm (“The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the 
right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family, includ-
ing adequate . . . housing . . . [and] will take appropriate steps to insure the realiza-
tion of this right . . . . ”). 
 12 Peter Salins commented that one of the typical concomitants to good cause 
eviction provisions, rent regulation, “is not only entrenched, it is spreading.  Like 
alien creatures in a science fiction movie, the tentacles of rent regulation have long 
since wandered from historic epicenters such as New York City and now reach every 
corner of this nation.”  Peter Salins, Reflections on Rent Control and the Theory of Efficient 
Regulation, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 775, 775–76 (1988). 
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through which the social goal of decent housing for all is to be 
achieved.13  The creation of a mass of new public housing is certainly 
a possibility.14  But just as likely is the continuation of an old Euro-
pean favorite—maintaining a scheme of good cause eviction, both in 
the public and private rental housing sectors, to control supply. 
The base notion of a good cause eviction scheme is that a land-
lord’s ability to terminate or refuse to renew his tenant’s lease, and 
therefore force the tenant to navigate a possibly perilous housing 
market to find new accommodations, must be limited substantially.15  
Regardless of the fact that a tenant may have no lease at all, or that 
the term of the lease he once had may have expired, he may continue 
in the rental housing unless and until the landlord offers a good 
enough reason to evict him.16
Good cause eviction rules are pervasive in European countries, 
and are almost universally designed to rectify housing crises, particu-
larly those caused by housing shortages.17  The evidence, however, 
demonstrates that they do not solve supply problems, and in fact may 
even impede achievement of social housing goals by creating new 
economic problems. 
With the proliferation of housing problems all over the globe, 
and an increased awareness of and call for action on those problems 
like the one seen in France, a real danger exists that good cause evic-
tion requirements will spread worldwide.  Even in the United States, 
these dangerous schemes have begun to take hold. 
This Article seeks to call awareness to that problem and to sug-
gest that further intrusion must be prevented.  Part II describes the 
 13 Law No. 2007-290 of March 5, 2007, Journal Officiel de la République Fran-
çaise [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], March 5, 2007, p. 4190, available at 
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr (follow “Les autres textes législatifs et réglementaires” 
hyperlink). 
 14 The French government intends to construct 120,000 new homes per year un-
til 2012 in an effort to implement this new guarantee of housing.  See French PM Vows, 
supra note 6.  In 2000, France spent €19.27 billion on various housing assistance pro-
grams, including €2.05 billion in construction subsidies, €5.34 billion in aid to indi-
viduals, and €9.39 billion in tax relief.  Embassy of France in the United States, Hous-
ing in France, available at http://www.ambafrance-us.org/atoz/housing.asp. 
 15 Kenneth Salzberg & Audrey Zibelman, Good Cause Eviction, 21 WILLAMETTE L. 
REV. 61, 62–63 (1985). 
 16 Id.  Good cause eviction is premised on a “tenant’s presumptive right to con-
tinue in possession.”  Id. 
 17 Housing shortages following World War I led to the adoption of good cause 
eviction schemes in Germany, the United Kingdom, Sweden, and Italy.  See infra Part 
II.  In the United States, post-war housing shortages led to the imposition of a good 
cause eviction scheme in Washington, D.C.  See infra notes 292–94 and accompanying 
text. 
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growing global movement toward limiting tenant eviction to good 
cause.  The law of several European jurisdictions serves to illustrate 
the varying forms and effects of a good cause eviction scheme.  Part 
III goes on to describe the reasons for which a jurisdiction’s adoption 
of a good cause eviction scheme represents a serious misstep.  The 
negative and substantial long-term economic effects are detailed.  
Part IV demonstrates that good cause eviction schemes are slowly in-
fecting even American law.  Finally, Part V suggests that if we are not 
successful in warding off the further intrusion of good cause eviction 
schemes in this country, we will suffer.  Good cause eviction rules will 
fail to solve housing crises here, just as they have in Europe.  And just 
as we are seeing abroad, in the long term, we may end up worse off 
for their adoption. 
II. THE GLOBAL MOVEMENT TO LIMIT  
LANDLORD ABILITY TO EVICT OR REFUSE TO RENEW LEASES 
Schemes of good cause eviction are quite prevalent throughout 
Europe.  Those countries that have adopted them with the hope of 
solving serious housing problems are by no means small or insignifi-
cant actors on the international scene.  Germany, Italy, and France, 
for instance, all limit the right of a landlord to evict his tenant, or to 
refuse to renew an expired lease, to good cause.18  Smaller countries, 
such as Portugal and Austria, have followed suit.19
Precisely what will satisfy the requirement of good cause varies 
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.  Faulty or culpable behavior on the 
part of the tenant—such as failing to pay rent for an extended pe-
riod, conducting illegal activities on the premises, or breaching the 
lease in some significant way—almost always suffices.20  Some good 
 18 See D.C. STAFFORD, THE ECONOMICS OF HOUSING POLICY 45 (1978) (describing 
the English trend toward security of tenure over the last decade). 
 19 See SANDRA PASSINHAS, EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW FORUM AT THE EUROPEAN 
UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE, THE EUROPEANISATION OF PRIVATE LAWS—PORTUGAL 1 (2004), 
available at http://www.eui.eu/LAW/ResearchTeaching/EuropeanPrivateLaw/Pro 
jects/TenancyLawPortugal.pdf; BRIGITTA LURGER & ANDREA HABERL, EUROPEAN 
PRIVATE LAW FORUM AT THE EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE, THE EUROPEANISATION OF 
PRIVATE LAW—AUSTRIA 1 (2004), available at http://www.eui.eu/LAW/Research 
Teaching/EuropeanPrivateLaw/Projects/TenancyLawAustria.pdf.  The European 
Tenancy Law project, of which both of these articles are a part, is an ongoing re-
search project of the European Private Law Forum at the European University Insti-
tute concerned with a comparative assessment of national tenancy laws among Euro-
pean Union countries. 
 20 See, e.g., MARÍA ESTHER BLAS LÓPEZ, EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW FORUM AT THE 
EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE, THE EUROPEANISATION OF PRIVATE LAW—SPAIN 10–
11, (2004), available at http://www.eui.eu/LAW/ResearchTeaching/EuropeanPriv 
ateLaw/Projects/TenancyLawSpain.pdf (Spanish grounds for eviction include, inter 
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cause eviction schemes even provide for more landlord-focused rea-
sons, including the landlord’s desire to demolish or remodel his 
building, or perhaps even to occupy it himself.21
While it may seem at first blush that there really is no common 
thread among jurisdictions employing the scheme as to what that 
good cause might be, further study brings a commonality to light.  
Nearly every jurisdiction that limits landlord eviction to good cause 
interprets it in a very narrow fashion and heavily skews it in favor of 
the tenant. 
A. An Exceptionally Narrow View of Landlord Need as Good Cause 
Perhaps one of the more commonly proffered “good causes” for 
which landlords seek to evict or fail to renew the leases of their ten-
ants, at least absent some tenant misconduct, is their own need of the 
premises.22  Given a property owner’s right to use his investment as he 
so desires, one might expect jurisdictions to be rather liberal in allow-
ing landlord need to provide the good cause necessary to evict a ten-
ant.  In fact, precisely the opposite is true.  Most jurisdictions with a 
good cause eviction scheme employ a very restrictive standard.  Land-
lord “need” must, really, be more than need.  It must be desperation. 
Portuguese law provides an instructive example of the applica-
tion of the “need” standard.  The rights of landlords and tenants in 
Portugal are set out both in the Portuguese Civil Code and in special 
statutes, which substantially restrict a landlord’s right to bring an end 
to a lease.23
When a landlord and tenant perfect a lease contract without a 
definite term in Portugal, the law supplies a default term of six 
alia, failure to pay rent, intentionally causing “unauthorized works in the house,” and 
using the premises for purposes other than that for which they were leased); 
PASSINHAS, supra note 19, at 25 (good cause for eviction under Portuguese law in-
cludes, inter alia, failure to pay rent, using the premises for “unlawful, indecent and 
dishonest practices,” and substantially changing the premises). 
 21 See infra Part II.A--B. 
 22 See, e.g., Velosa Barreto v. Portugal, App. No. 18072/91, 1995 Y.B. Eur. Conv. 
on H.R. 355 (Eur. Ct. H.R.), available at http://www.ius.info/EUII/euchr/doku 
menti/1995/11/case_of_velosa_barreto_v._portugal_21_11_1995.html. 
 23 The Civil Code sets out the basic rules applicable to the landlord-tenant rela-
tionship in Portugal.  Special statutory schemes, including the Rural Tenancy Regime 
(Decree-Law 385.88, of 25.10 (1988)), Forester Tenancy Regime (Decree-Law 
394/88, of 8.11 (1988)), and Urban Tenancy Regime (Decree-Law 321-B/90, of 
15.10 (1990)) expand upon and further those general rules of the Civil Code in par-
ticular contexts. 
CARROLL_FINAL 3/30/2008  1:43:04 PM 
2008] GOOD CAUSE EVICTION 433 
 
months.24  But because the law also provides for automatic renewal 
for successive periods, such a lease essentially becomes a lease of in-
definite duration, which lasts until one party gives notice of his con-
trary intention.25  The Portuguese tenant may give notice of his inten-
tion to quit without proffering any specific reason.  He need only 
comply with a requirement that he give the notice within a particular 
period before he vacates.26  Landlords, on the other hand, are not af-
forded the same freedom.  They may terminate only when they prove: 
(1) need in themselves or their descendants to occupy the leased 
property; (2) need of the leased property to build a home for them-
selves or their first degree descendants; (3) desire to expand the 
leased premises or increase the number of leased units, but only if 
the relevant public authority has already approved an architectural 
plan; or (4) that public authorities have found the building to be 
“degraded and, technically or economically, . . . not recommended to 
be improved.”27
Even when a Portuguese landlord can make out one of these 
grounds, however, he may not succeed in retaking the premises.  If 
the landlord seeks to terminate for “residential purposes” (essentially 
the first and second grounds), he must also prove that he has owned 
the property for more than five years28 and that he (or his descen-
dants, if he is arguing their need) cannot possibly find “another 
house (owned or rented)” anywhere “in the area of the judicial dis-
tricts of Lisboa or Porto or their surrounding areas, or, for another 
part of the country, in the same city” that will meet their housing 
need.29  This latter requirement, of course, is virtually never satisfied, 
as landlords can nearly always find other, albeit less desirable, ac-
commodations.30
 24 PASSINHAS, supra note 19, at 26.  Residential tenancy contracts in Portugal may 
not provide a term of less than five years; when they do, they are typically considered 
indefinite term contracts subject to the rules detailed here.  Id. at 24. 
 25 Id. at 26. 
 26 The length of the notice required depends upon how long the lease has ex-
isted.  Tenants must generally give six months notice to leave a lease that has lasted 
more than six years, sixty days for leases lasting between one and six years, thirty days 
for leases lasting between three months and a year, and one-third of the duration for 
leases lasting less than three months.   CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 1055 (Port.) (1966); 
see also PASSINHAS, supra note 19, at 26. 
 27 PASSINHAS, supra note 19, at 26–27. 
 28 This requirement does not apply where the landlord acquired the property “by 
hereditary succession.”  Id. at 27. 
 29 Id. 
 30 A landlord’s existing cramped living area shared with seven other people, for 
instance, would likely supply cause for denying his claim to evict tenants under the 
Portuguese need standard because that landlord has a home.  See generally Velosa 
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Moreover, even where a Portuguese landlord meets every one of 
these exceptionally rigorous requirements—he proves a dire need, 
five years ownership, and a lack of any other housing possibility—he 
may have to suffer through a delay before the eviction will be carried 
out.  Portuguese courts are empowered to delay evictions for up to a 
year “for social reasons.”31  Specifically, if a court finds that contem-
poraneous enforcement of a valid eviction order would effect 
“greater prejudice to the tenant than benefits [to] the landlord” or 
“[w]hen it is the tenant’s poverty that motivates the lack of payment 
of rent” (for which, of course, the landlord could legitimately evict), 
it is authorized to impose a stay on the eviction.32  Analyzing such so-
cial mores might involve considering the parties’ “good faith, the fact 
that [the] tenant may become homeless, the number of persons liv-
ing with the tenant, his or her age, his or her health, and, in general, 
the social and economic condition of the people involved.”33
The case of Velosa Barreto v. Portugal34 illustrates the breadth and 
inequity of the Portuguese need standard.  Applicant Velosa Barreto 
inherited a three-bedroom, one-bath home in the Portuguese city of 
Funchal.35  The home had been rented for roughly eighteen years be-
fore Velosa Barreto became owner, with a rent that increased by only 
twenty-five percent during that period.36  Five months after he inher-
ited the home, Velosa Barreto brought an action against the tenant, 
seeking to end the lease so that Velosa Barreto and his family could 
occupy the home.37   
Velosa Barreto argued that his family had a true need for the 
home, which justified the termination of the tenants’ lease.38  Specifi-
Barreto v. Portugal, App. No. 18072/91, 1995 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 355 (Eur. Ct. 
H.R.) (refusing landlord’s request to evict tenant to personally occupy space because 
landlord had alternative accommodations). 
 31 PASSINHAS, supra note 19, at 28. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Velosa Barreto v. Portugal, App. No. 18072/91, 1995 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 
355 (Eur. Ct. H.R.). 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id.  The facts of Velosa Barreto do not clarify the precise term of the lease on the 
subject property.  Because the Portuguese Civil Code provides for continual tacit re-
newal in the absence of tenant notice to quit, however, the lease can be likened to an 
American periodic tenancy.  See C. CIV. art. 1095 (Port.) (1966), repealed by Decree-
Law 321-B/90, of Oct. 15, 1990 (reenacting rule as part of new Urban Tenancy Re-
gime). 
 37 Velosa Barreto v. Portugal, App. No. 18072/91, 1995 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 
355 (Eur. Ct. H.R.). 
 38 Id. 
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cally, he pointed to his own unsatisfactory living conditions.39  At the 
time of his suit, Velosa Barreto lived in a four-bedroom rental with his 
wife and son, his mother- and father-in-law, his brother-in-law, and 
two of his wife’s aunts.40  The quarters were exceptionally crowded.41  
Privacy for all members of the family was virtually nonexistent, and it 
was not possible for his child to have his own room.42  All of the par-
ties involved were unhappy, but “resigned” to these living conditions 
because he and his family had “nowhere else to live.”43
After the litigation stretched on for nearly six years,44 the Fun-
chal court denied Velosa Barreto’s application for an order authoriz-
ing the eviction, finding that he had not sufficiently shown “facts 
which proved a real need to occupy the house himself.”45  The court 
particularly noted Velosa Barreto’s failure to prove exceptionally 
strained relations with his in-laws.46  That the family got along rather 
well personally and made the best of an ugly situation actually hurt 
Velosa Barreto.47  In the absence of proof of all out warfare in the 
household, the Funchal court concluded that Velosa Barreto and his 
family had no real “need” for a home of their own.48
On appeal to the Lisbon Court of Appeals, the Funchal court’s 
judgment was affirmed.49  Finally, in 1991, Velosa Barreto appealed to 
the European Commission of Human Rights,50 which ultimately re-
ferred the case to the European Court of Human Rights.51
Velosa Barreto argued before the European Court of Human 
Rights that the Portuguese court system’s refusal to grant him an or-
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Velosa Barreto v. Portugal, App. No. 18072/91, 1995 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 
355 (Eur. Ct. H.R.). 
 44 Id.  The European Court of Human Rights opinion provides no hint as to the 
reason for the lengthy delay.  Id. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Velosa Barreto v. Portugal, App. No. 18072/91, 1995 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 
355 (Eur. Ct. H.R.). 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id.  The European Court of Human Rights was established in 1959 as a mecha-
nism to enforce the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamen-
tal Freedoms, drafted by the Council of Europe in 1950.  Portugal ratified the Con-
vention on Sept. 11, 1978.  See European Court of Human Rights—The Court, 
http://www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/EN/Header/The+Court/The+Court/History+of+t
he+Court. 
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der allowing termination of the lease amounted to a violation of Arti-
cle 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.52  On its own 
motion, the Court also examined Velosa Barreto’s application to de-
termine whether there might also be a violation of Article 1 of Proto-
col 1 of the Convention.53
Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights pro-
vides: 
1.  Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, 
his home and his correspondence. 
2.  There shall be no interference by a public authority with the 
exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law 
and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of the na-
tional security, public safety or the economic well-being of the 
country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protec-
tion of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others.54
Protocol 1 provides similarly: 
Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment 
of his possessions.  No one shall be deprived of his possessions ex-
cept in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided 
for by law and by the general principles of international law. 
The preceding provision shall not, however, in any way impair the 
right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to con-
trol the use of property in accordance with the general interest or 
to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penal-
ties.55
Velosa Barreto argued that Article 8 implies a right in every fam-
ily “to a home for themselves alone.”56  He maintained that Portugal’s 
failure to allow him to assert that right by evicting his tenant 
amounted to an unacceptable intrusion on his rights under Article 
8.57
 52 Velosa Barreto v. Portugal, App. No. 18072/91, 1995 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 
355 (Eur. Ct. H.R.). 
 53 Id. 
 54 See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms art. 8, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222. 
 55 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
Protocol 1, Mar. 20, 1952, Eur. T.S. No. 009.  Portugal ratified Protocol 1 on Sept. 9, 
1978.  See Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fun-
damental Freedoms—Ratification Dates, http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Com 
mun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=009&C-M=8&DF=2/21/2008&CL=ENG. 
 56 Velosa Barreto v. Portugal, App. No. 18072/91, 1995 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 
355 (Eur. Ct. H.R.). 
 57 Id. 
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In assessing Velosa Barreto’s application, the European Court of 
Human Rights was required to examine Portuguese eviction law in 
some detail.58  Its role was not to determine whether Velosa Barreto 
met the legal requirements for eviction; that fell within the province 
of the Portuguese courts, which “were clearly better placed than the 
European Court to assess the facts at a given time and place.”59  
Rather, the European Court of Human Rights was to determine 
whether the Portuguese legislation provided a restraint on landlords 
that rose to a level sufficient to impinge on the benefits they enjoy 
under the European Convention on Human Rights.60
In so analyzing the Portuguese tenancy termination rules, the 
Court found that the goal of the good cause eviction scheme was “a 
legitimate [one], namely the social protection of tenants.”61  In es-
sence, the restrictions “tend[] to promote the economic well-being of 
the country and the protection of the rights of others.”62  Essentially, 
then, the Court found that Portugal could, in accordance with the 
language of Article 8, subordinate the right of a private landowner to 
the economic wellbeing of the country. 
To satisfy itself that such subordination was “necessary,” as Arti-
cle 8 requires, the Court looked to the history surrounding the en-
actment of the Portuguese Civil Code articles restricting eviction to 
need on the part of the landlord.63  At one time, such onerous intru-
sions upon the right of the landowner to retake his property were 
considered absolutely necessary in light of a severe shortage of hous-
ing in Funchal.64  By the time of Velosa Barreto’s action, however, 
census records demonstrated that no such crisis persisted.65  None-
theless, the European Court of Human Rights accepted Portugal’s 
argument that strict tenancy termination provisions continued to be 
necessary to avoid economic decline.66  Thus, the Court voted eight 
to one that Velosa Barreto’s Article 8 “right to respect for his family 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Velosa Barreto v. Portugal, App. No. 18072/91, 1995 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 
355 (Eur. Ct. H.R.). 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. 
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and private life, his home and his correspondence” yielded to Portu-
gal’s need to restrict that right in the interest of economics.67
Similarly, the Court found that Protocol 1 allowed for govern-
mental fixing of eviction standards.  Although the plain language of 
the provision prohibits deprivations of “peaceful enjoyment of pos-
sessions,” it allows for the creation of exceptions states may find nec-
essary to “control the use of property in accordance with the general 
interest . . . .”68  In essence, Protocol 1 requires only that the Portu-
guese eviction rules “strike a fair balance between the demands of the 
general interest of the community and the requirements of the pro-
tection of the individual’s fundamental rights.”69  The European 
Court of Human Rights accepted Portugal’s argument that the appli-
cation of its eviction rules to deprive Velosa Barreto of the right to 
enjoy the property he owned was merely a “control of the use” of his 
property.70  As such, Velosa Barreto’s interest fell, again by a vote of 
eight to one, to his father’s tenant.71
Thus, in 1995, thirty-one years after the lease began and nearly thir-
teen years after Velosa Barreto inherited the property at issue, he was 
still unable to assert his right to occupy the property he owned.72  The 
effect of the decision, then, is essentially to create a persistent and vir-
tually interminable lease.  Velosa Barreto could hardly have shown a 
more substantial need to occupy his property.  Still, it was not 
enough. 
Tenant protections are clearly exceptionally strong under the 
Portuguese regime.  Indeed, commentators well-versed in the coun-
try’s tenancy law have remarked that “the main feature of the regime 
is the protection of the tenant, considered to be the weaker party to 
the contract.”73
 67 Id.  One dissenter found that the court did not give sufficient weight to the 
possibility that Velosa Barreto might choose to increase the size of his family, a right 
the dissenter viewed as an important element of family life.  Id.  The dissent also con-
cluded that the majority did not strike a fair balance between the protecting the right 
of the landlord (to peaceful enjoyment of his possessions) and the right of the ten-
ant.  Id. 
 68 Velosa Barreto v. Portugal, App. No. 18072/91, 1995 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 
355 (Eur. Ct. H.R.). 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. 
 73 PASSINHAS, supra note 19, at 1; see Jeremy McBride, The Right to Property, 21 EUR. 
L. REV. HUM. RTS. SURV. 40, 45–47 (1996) (discussing a “remarkably indulgent 
view . . . of the overriding right of property owners to recover their apartments from 
tenants”). 
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And the arguably egregiously broad tenant protections that exist 
in Portugal, surprisingly, are not the most stifling provisions one can 
find in Europe.  The basic Swedish rule of lease termination is that a 
tenant “enjoys the right to prolong [his lease] contract.”74  A tenant’s 
right to persist on the premises may only be set aside if his reasons for 
renewing his contract are not as strong as his landlord’s reasons for 
terminating the agreement.75  Furthermore, landlords are at a signifi-
cant disadvantage in Sweden because, even under this balancing test, 
if a landlord rents an apartment dwelling to a tenant on an indefinite 
duration lease, the landlord’s argument that he has true need of the 
property for his own use will “not be a sufficient reason for terminat-
ing the contract.”76  Swedish law does make concessions for a land-
lord renting out a family home.77  True need may provide grounds 
for giving notice to end a lease in these cases, “at least if [the land-
lord] intends to live [on the premises] permanently.”78  But a person 
letting an apartment dwelling has no such freedom. 
The trend in Europe, then, is to sanction landlord need as a 
technical way of making out the good cause needed to evict or refuse 
to renew the lease of a tenant.  But the Portuguese and Swedish ex-
amples demonstrate that need is viewed so restrictively that, practi-
cally speaking, landlord desire to personally occupy the rented prem-
ises hardly ever rises to the level of “good cause.” 
B. An Overemphasis on Protection of Weak Tenants 
The history of Italian landlord-tenant law demonstrates quite 
well the related trend of European tenancy law to overprotect tenants 
that could be viewed as the least bit socially disadvantaged.  Substan-
tial regulation of the law of leases began in Italy shortly after World 
War I, when financial strife and a short supply of housing created 
problems in the country’s rental housing market.79  The Italian gov-
ernment responded in 1921 with a double-featured plan that both 
 74 Jordabalk [JB] [Land Law Code] 12:3 (Swed.).  See ULF JENSEN, EUROPEAN 
PRIVATE LAW FORUM AT THE EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE, THE EUROPEANISATION OF 
PRIVATE LAW—SWEDEN 3 (2004), available at http://iue.it/LAW/ResearchTeaching/ 
EuropeanPrivateLaw/TenancyLawSweden.pdf. 
 75 JENSEN, supra note 74, at 24. 
 76 Id. at 22. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. 
 79 UMBERTO BRECCIA & ELENA BARGELLI, EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW FORUM AT THE 
EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE, THE EUROPEANISATION OF PRIVATE LAW—ITALY 1 
(2004), available at http://www.eui.eu/law/ResearchTeaching/EuropeanPrivateLaw 
/Projects/TenancyLawItaly.pdf. 
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controlled rent and prevented termination of tenancy contracts.80  
Even in the post-war economy, that system “was considered an assault 
on individual property rights.”81  The regime provoked so much out-
rage that, while it was not expressly held unconstitutional, the Italian 
Constitutional Court suggested that the regime be jettisoned and re-
placed with a more practical system for regulating tenancy as soon as 
practicable.82
The post-war Italian system was revamped in the 1970s and a new 
and complete statute for regulating both residential and commercial 
tenancies took hold in 1978.83  The new statute focused primarily on 
setting standards for rents.  Because of this focus, it was dubbed the 
“equo canone” (or “fair rent”) law.84  The scheme was “founded upon 
the rationale of distributive justice” and thus greatly emphasized ten-
ant need and the right to housing over the desires of landlord-
owners.85  The overt protections given to tenants seemed broad, but 
perhaps not totally slanted, at least on the face of the statute.  Short-
term tenancy contracts were not permitted under the equo canone law.  
Parties were not allowed to perfect lease contracts for periods shorter 
than four years.86  And the landlord, at least, was bound to continue 
the lease for the duration of the agreed-upon term.87  Tenants, in 
contrast, were permitted to end even a term lease merely by giving six 
months notice.88  Regardless of the length of the lease, the most ten-
ant-friendly aspect of the equo canone law was that part which took the 
setting of the rent completely out of the parties’ hands.  Rent was 
fixed by law, and was not a subject on which the parties were permit-
ted to come to their own agreement.89
However these rent and term restrictions looked on paper, they 
were applied by the Italian government in a manner exceptionally 
oppressive to private property owners.  And even worse, when rent 
controls and intrusions into parties’ freedom of contract in the form 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. 
 82 Id.  The Court further hinted that it would not hesitate to strike down the re-
gime were it not replaced within a reasonable period.  Id. 
 83 Id. at 2. 
 84 See id.; see also Kenneth Baar, Guidelines for Drafting Rent Control Laws: Lessons of a 
Decade, 35 RUTGERS L. REV. 723, 735 (1983) (noting that Italy’s equo canone law was 
based on the idea that equity would be obtained in the housing market if compara-
ble rents were established for comparable units). 
 85 BRECCIA & BARGELLI, supra note 79, at 1. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. 
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of long-term tenancy requirements did not succeed in creating a 
housing situation that the Italian government found desirable, it re-
sorted to layering suspension of eviction orders on top of the rent 
and term provisions in a manner that further prejudiced landlords.90
The case of Spadea v. Italy perfectly demonstrates the problem of 
Italian focus on the socially disadvantaged party to the lease con-
tract.91  Applicants Spadea and Scalabrino purchased two residential 
flats in Milan, Italy in April of 1982.92  The flats were rented at the 
time of the purchase, with leases set to expire on December 31, 
1982.93  In October of that year, the applicants properly gave notice 
to the tenants occupying the flats, requesting that they vacate the 
premises at the expiration of the lease term.94  The tenants, “elderly 
ladies of modest means,” refused to budge.95  Spadea and Scalabrino 
requested eviction orders from a local magistrate, and those orders 
were issued in January of 1983.96  Two years later, in 1985, the tenants 
still refused to vacate and the Italian government would offer no po-
lice assistance in securing the eviction.97  Moreover, in February of 
1985, the Italian government suspended enforcement of all eviction 
orders for another eleven months.98  Shortly after that eviction en-
forcement order was lifted, another came into effect.99  And then yet 
another.100  As the years wore on, Spadea and Scalabrino were forced 
to buy another flat just so as to have a place to live.101
Spadea and Scalabrino finally recovered possession of their flats, 
six and seven years after the leases on them terminated.102  Even then, 
it was not a result of a change in Italian law, but rather as a result of 
fortuity.  One tenant died and the other eventually left voluntarily.103
If the Spadea case were an exceptional one, we might lament it as 
an unfortunate, but not dangerous, set of circumstances.  When 
viewed as anomalous, it seems, perhaps, less egregious.  Unfortu-
 90 Id. at 14–15. 
 91 Spadea v. Italy, App. No. 12868/87, 21 Eur. H.R. Rep. 482 (1996). 
 92 Id. at 484. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. 
 96 Id. 
 97 Spadea, 21 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 484. 
 98 Id. 
 99 Id. 
 100 Id. 
 101 Id. 
 102 Id. 
 103 Spadea, 21 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 484. 
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nately, a glance at even a small portion of the Italian landlord-tenant 
jurisprudence quickly proves that what happened to Spadea and 
Scalabrino was not at all rare.  Scores of landlords met similar fates 
under the Italian tenancy regime of the 1980s.  In another Italian 
eviction case that made its way to the European Court of Human 
Rights—Scollo v. Italy104—the plaintiff-landlord complained of eviction 
staggering and suspension orders that prevented him from evicting a 
tenant whose lease had ended more than eleven years earlier.105  
Much like the applicants in Spadea, Scollo regained possession of his 
property, eleven years after the termination of the lease and after 
seven years without full payment of the agreed upon rent, solely be-
cause the tenant voluntarily left.106  Likewise, in Immobiliare Saffi v. It-
aly,107 the applicant company regained possession of its property thir-
teen years after the lease ended.108  Police assistance was never given 
to secure the eviction, but the tenant eventually died.109
In short, the Italian regime of the late 1970s and 1980s was one 
that effected serious oppression of landlord interests in the name of 
social justice and economic development.  The series of eviction sus-
pension orders issued during this time were often referred to as nec-
essary and “emergency” measures to quell a serious shortage of low-
income housing.110  But the fact is that the purportedly “emergency” 
provisions remained in effect for more than forty years.111  Subordina-
tion of landlord interests, then, essentially became the norm in Italy. 
The equo canone regime—both in its obsessive rent controls and 
corollary eviction suspension orders—was soon recognized as an un-
acceptable one.  Cases such as Spadea, Scollo, and Immobiliare Saffi illus-
trated the flaws of the Italian tenancy laws and eventually led people 
to conclude that the regime’s effect was the opposite of that in-
tended.  In practice, it failed to solve the problem of a small supply of 
adequate low-cost housing, but rather “dissuaded landlords from let-
ting their property, thus increasing demand.”112
For these reasons, the equo canone regime was set aside in 1998, 
at least insofar as residential properties are concerned, in favor of a 
 104 App. No. 22774/93, 22 Eur. H.R. Rep. 514 (1999). 
 105 Id. at 515–16. 
 106 Id. at 516. 
 107 App. No. 22774/93, 30 Eur. H.R. Rep. 756 (1999). 
 108 Id. at 759. 
 109 Id. 
 110 See id. at 758; Scollo, 22 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 525 (Mr. H.G. Schermers, dissenting);  
see also BRECCIA & BARGELLI, supra note 79, at 1–2. 
 111 McBride, supra note 73, at 46. 
 112 BRECCIA & BARGELLI, supra note 79, at 2. 
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new regime.113  The goal of Italy’s new tenancy law was to effectuate a 
“trade off” between the typically diametric interests of landlords and 
tenants.114  Whether the regime actually accomplishes this lofty goal is 
a matter on which interested parties may never come to agreement. 
The 1998 statute essentially relies on a combination of duration 
and termination provisions to effectuate the tenant protection that 
Italy has long desired as a matter of social policy.115  Residential lease 
contracts may not establish a term of less than four years.116  This is 
already an obviously onerous provision for landlords.  Typically, how-
ever, it gets even worse for them.  The statute allows a landlord to re-
take his property after the termination of the lease, provided he has 
given the tenant at least six months notice to vacate.117  The problem 
is that this notice will only be effective if the landlord has “legitimate 
grounds” for terminating the lease.118  The expiration of the lease 
term, surprisingly, is insufficient to supply such a ground.  Essentially, 
a landlord will only be permitted to retake his premises after the ex-
piration of the original lease when he can demonstrate that his “in-
terests take priority over [the] tenant’s right to housing.”119  In effect, 
the landlord is forced to show some sort of “good cause” for evicting 
a tenant whose term lease has expired. 
This “good cause” or “legitimate ground,” as one might imagine 
given Italy’s historical penchant for protecting tenants, garners a nar-
row definition in Italian law, though perhaps it is not so narrow as in 
Portugal.  A landlord’s desire (presumably, need is not required) to 
“use the apartment for himself or his family members for housing or 
professional purposes” will suffice.120  Anything less is rather difficult 
to allege as a legitimate reason for enforcing the termination of an 
already expired lease.  A landlord may technically make out good 
cause where he wishes to use the premises not for living or for work-
ing, but for “public, cultural, [or] religious purposes,” but only when 
he also offers the existing tenant an alternate accommodation.121
 113 Id. 
 114 Id. at 13. 
 115 Id. 
 116 Id.  This rule applies where the landlord and tenant freely negotiate the lease.  
The minimum duration is shortened to three years where the parties allow landlord 
and tenant associations to supply a ceiling for the rent.  Id. 
 117 Id. 
 118 BRECCIA & BARGELLI, supra note 79, at 14. 
 119 Id. at 13. 
 120 Id. at 14.  The landlord is allowed to terminate a tenancy on this ground only 
after serving six months’ notice (after completion of a four year tenancy).  Id. 
 121 Id. 
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In the absence of proof of a legitimate ground, the Italian lease 
renews for another four years.122  At the end of the reconducted lease 
term, again, the landlord may terminate only upon giving a six-
month notice to his tenant, but this time, no legitimate ground for 
termination is needed along with the notice.123  The mere expiration 
of the lease term is sufficient ground for recognizing the end of the 
parties’ relationship. 
In effect, then, absent “good cause,” an Italian landlord is stuck 
with a lease lasting at least eight years!  And even worse, after this 
eight years expires, he may still find himself unable to retake posses-
sion of his property.  Just as striking as the good cause provisions of 
the 1998 statute is the fact that it carries forward, albeit in modified 
form, the notion behind the eviction suspension orders of the 1978 
Italian regime.124  Although eviction suspension is not generally pro-
vided for as it was in 1978, the 1998 statute retains it “if the house is 
situated in a highly populated municipal district.”125  In such areas, a 
valid eviction order is typically suspended for six months.  And where 
the tenant is “unemployed,” sixty-five years old, or has at least five 
children, the suspension stretches to eighteen months.126  Thus, a 
landlord that entered into a simple four-year lease—the very shortest 
duration Italian law would allow him to perfect—may find himself 
stuck with a lease of nearly ten years with no way out. 
Unfortunately, Italy is not alone in overprotecting tenants.  In 
Germany, perhaps the biggest tenant protection comes from the fact 
that lease contracts limited in time are generally not allowed.  The 
German Civil Code provides that such a “fixed term contract can only 
be concluded if the landlord has a reason for such a limitation.”127  
Legitimate reasons for perfecting a term contract would include the 
landlord’s desire to live in the premises himself, or a planned renova-
tion that would not be possible or would be overly burdensome if a 
tenant were living on the premises.128  The landlord must inform his 
 122 Id. at 15. 
 123 Id. 
 124 BRECCIA & BARGELLI, supra note 79, at 15. 
 125 Id. 
 126 Id. 
 127 See WOLFGANG WURMNEST, EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW FORUM AT THE EUROPEAN 
UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE, THE EUROPEANISATION OF PRIVATE LAW—GERMANY 37, available 
at http://www.iue.it/law/ResearchTeaching/EuropeanPrivateLaw/Projects/Tenanc 
yLawGermany.pdf; see also Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] [Civil Code] Aug. 18, 
1896, Bundesgesetzblatt, Teil I [BGBl. I], as amended, § 575. 
 128 See BGB § 575, ¶ 1; see also WURMNEST, supra note 127, at 37–38. 
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tenant of his rationale for seeking a term contract in writing.129  As a 
result of these rather stringent rules, as one might imagine, most 
leases in Germany are deemed to be contracts of unlimited time.130  
This extended tenure certainly provides German tenants with a large 
measure of protection not present in leases perfected in the United 
States. 
And the German tenant protections do not stop there.  Their 
rules governing termination of leases by notice are also substantially 
protective of tenants.  Specifically, German notice provisions are 
quite lopsided.  A tenant may end an indefinite duration lease at any 
time merely by giving a three-month notice.131  No justification is nec-
essary.  The landlord, on the other hand, “has relatively few possibili-
ties to terminate the [lease] contract.”132  He may terminate the lease 
by giving notice only where he has a “legitimate interest” in the con-
tract’s termination.133  And, of course, the German Civil Code defines 
this “legitimate interest” quite narrowly.  The sole circumstances suf-
ficient to warrant termination of the ongoing tenancy relationship 
are: (1) tenant breach of a contractual duty; (2) landlord need for 
the leased premises;134 or (3) a lease contract that “prevents the land-
lord from making an economically justifiable use of the premises.”135
The restrictive grounds for landlord notice already narrow the 
factual scenarios that will give rise to a valid termination by landlord 
notice quite substantially.  But German law then deals another blow 
to landlords who can meet this stringent burden by allowing the ten-
ant to contest the termination and demand continuation of the lease 
if termination “would give rise to hardship for the tenant or his family 
that would be unjustified even in the light of the legitimate interests 
of the landlord.”136  Moreover, even if the interests of the landlord 
outweigh those of the tenant and the eviction is deemed lawful and 
 129 WURMNEST, supra note 127, at 38. 
 130 See id. 
 131 See id.; see also BGB § 573c, ¶ 1. 
 132 WURMNEST, supra note 127, at 34. 
 133 Id. 
 134 This requirement can be satisfied by a personal need on the part of the land-
lord, or a need of one of his family members, though German courts have been re-
luctant to find the notice proper for need of a brother-in-law or sister-in-law.  Id. at 
35–36. 
 135 See id. at 34; see also BGB § 573, ¶ 2. 
 136 WURMNEST, supra note 127, at 34.  Some German leases are exempt from these 
harsh requirements.  The rules set out here do not apply, for instance, where the 
landlord is living in the premises himself.  Id. 
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appropriate, a court may delay it upon the tenant’s request for up to 
one year “to avoid hardship.”137
And if the Italian and German examples are not telling enough, 
the modern French tenancy law is perhaps the most overt European 
example of an emphasis on the rights of the tenant at the expense of 
landlords.  The bulk of the current French landlord-tenant law was 
enacted in 1981 by a socialist regime that believed the thrust of ten-
ancy law should be to “protect the weak party against the stronger, 
i.e.[,] the tenant against the landlord.  Tenants were considered to be 
abused by unscrupulous landlords taking advantage . . . [of their lack 
of] legal protection.”138  Several revisions have modified the French 
tenancy regime since 1981, but its salient features remain.  Tenants 
are exceptionally well-protected.  As with most European landlords, 
French landlords may terminate lease contracts only for “legitimate 
and serious reason.”139
Perhaps the most tenant-friendly aspect of French law is its 
treatment of eviction enforcement.  In all cases, French judges have 
absolute discretion to grant tenants délais de grâce of up to three years.  
The court must find that “seriously unfair consequences could result 
from the eviction” to grant such a delay.140  But presumably some-
thing less than abject homelessness will do.  Waiting for the end of 
the school year for the children or completing an employment pro-
ject, for example, may provide sufficient grounds for postponement 
of an eviction order.141  Even more tenant-friendly, however, is the 
French rule that no landlord may evict a tenant during the winter.  
 137 Id. at 36. 
 138 NATALIE BOCCADORO & ANTHONY CHAMBOREDON, EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW 
FORUM AT THE EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE, THE EUROPEANISATION OF PRIVATE 
LAW—FRANCE 2 (2004), available at http://www.iue.it/LAW/ResearchTeaching/Euro 
peanPrivateLaw/Projects/TenancyLawFrance.pdf. 
 139 Such reasons include, inter alia, the desire to sell the leased property and the 
desire to live on the premises or to allow a family member to do so.  Law No. 89-462 
of July 6, 1994, Journal Officiel de la République Française [J.O.] [Official Gazette of 
France], July 8, 1989, p. 8543, art. 15, available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr (fol-
low “Les autres textes législatifs et réglementaires” hyperlink); see also BOCCADORO & 
CHAMBOREDON, supra note 138, at 2.  This requirement is less protective of tenant 
rights in France than it is in other countries discussed herein, however.  This is true 
because the indefinite duration lease is prohibited under French law.  Thus, when we 
speak of a landlord “giving notice,” that notice is one that will end a fixed term lease.  
Nevertheless, lease terms are protective of French tenants, since they may be per-
fected for a minimum of three years (or six years if the landlord is a legal entity 
rather than an individual).  Id. 
 140 BOCCADORO & CHAMBOREDON, supra note 138, at 18. 
 141 Id. 
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The effect of this delay of grace is to suspend evictions for more than 
one third of every year—namely, from November 1 to March 15.142
In short, European tenancy regimes can be characterized as al-
most shockingly protective of tenants—at the expense, of course, of 
their landlords.  Good cause eviction schemes alone offer tenants a 
wealth of protection.  And when the grounds for good cause are in-
terpreted narrowly, or the good cause scheme is bolstered with evic-
tion suspension orders for “weak” occupants, landlords suffer signifi-
cant disadvantages. 
III. THE DELETERIOUS ECONOMIC  
EFFECTS OF A GOOD CAUSE SCHEME 
Even setting aside the fact that rules requiring good cause for 
tenant eviction or lease nonrenewal may represent a theoretically un-
justifiable balancing of the interests of equally innocent and needy 
private parties, such rules should be rejected because they are detri-
mental from an economic standpoint.  The majority of jurisdictions 
that have adopted a good cause eviction standard have done so to 
solve particular economic crises.  Yet both basic economic theory and 
empirical evidence demonstrate that good cause eviction rules have 
nearly the opposite economic effect of that intended. 
A. Exacerbating the Problem of Dwindling Supply 
Stringent restrictions upon the right of landlords to evict tenants 
are typically enacted in times of housing shortage.  The idea is a 
rather simple one.  If a great deal of affordable rental housing is not 
available, government feels pressure to act to protect tenants and to 
ensure that they are able to retain the housing they have for as long 
as possible.143  The easiest way for the law to promote tenant protec-
tion is to impose a requirement upon landlords to refrain from evict-
 142 Id.  The suspension begins from October 15 in Paris.  Law No. 90-449 of May 
31, 1990 [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], June 2, 1990, p. 6551, art. 21, available at 
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr (follow “Les autres textes législatifs et réglementaires” 
hyperlink).  The Polish landlord-tenant regime provides a similar winter suspension 
from November 1 to March 31 “for humanitarian reasons.”  EWA GROMNICKA & 
PRZEMYSLAW ZYSK, EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW FORUM AT THE EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY 
INSTITUTE, THE EUROPEANISATION OF PRIVATE LAW—POLAND 33 (2004), available at 
http://www.iue.it/LAW/ResearchTeaching/EuropeanPrivateLaw/Projects/Tenancy
LawPoland.pdf. 
 143 Robert G. Lee, Rent Control—The Economic Impact of Social Legislation, 12 OXFORD 
J. LEGAL STUD. 543, 544 (1992).  The goal of rent control, at least, is “to choke off 
speculation (or price inflation) in times of economic crisis, when strong demand 
faces a limited supply.”  SHLOMO ANGEL, HOUSING POLICY MATTERS: A GLOBAL 
ANALYSIS 120 (2000). 
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ing their tenants absent good cause, often layered with controls on 
the rent imposed.144
One failing of this strategy is that it can never achieve a long 
term solution to the problem it seeks to remedy.  Both requirements 
of good cause eviction alone and the rent controls that typically ac-
company them actually serve to discourage new investment in rental 
property, and thus hold stagnant the existing level of rental housing 
supply.  Potential investors are highly unlikely to purchase rental 
properties knowing that they will be subject to an especially stringent 
eviction standard.145  First, the effective loss of the ability to dispose of 
the property substantially disincentivizes housing market invest-
ment.146  What prospective landlord would pursue rental investments 
in the face of the utterly abysmal fates that befell the landlords in the 
Velosa Barreto147 and Spadea148 cases?  The landlords’ inability to make 
any use of the properties in those cases or even to sell the property 
for anything approaching a reasonable rate of return certainly of-
fends notions of the rights that should be afforded to the owners of 
private property.149  It is not surprising, perhaps, that the sale of 
 144 Rent controls are almost always a part of a good cause eviction scheme be-
cause, in the absence of a controlled rent, a landlord desiring to end a lease without 
good cause would escape the lease merely by raising the rent until it reached a level 
impossible for the tenant to meet.  No “eviction” would occur, and the landlord 
would therefore avoid liability.  Lawrence Berger, The New Residential Tenancy Law—
Are Landlords Public Utilities?, 60 NEB. L. REV. 707, 727–28 (1981). 
     Literally hundreds of volumes have been published both defending and attacking 
rent control.  It seems that both legal scholars and economists are split as to whether 
it provides any real economic benefits.  This paper focuses on good cause eviction, 
not rent control, while recognizing that rent control may play a significant role in an 
overall scheme of good cause eviction.  For an influential and thorough debate of 
the multitude of issues raised by rent control schemes, see generally Richard A. Ep-
stein, Rent Control and the Theory of Efficient Regulation, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 741 (1988) 
and the eight responses printed in that same volume, id. at 1215–80.  The effect of 
rent control from a purely theoretical economic perspective is nicely explored in 
Steven N.S. Cheung, A Theory of Price Control, 17 J.L. & ECON. 53 (1974). 
 145 See Berger, supra note 144, at 730. 
 146 While, in theory, a landlord with a tenant subject to eviction only for good 
cause may always just sell his property, reality demonstrates otherwise.  The hit the 
landlord takes on market value is typically significant enough to make disposal, at 
least practically speaking, an unacceptable option.  Lee, supra note 143, at 551–52. 
 147 Velosa Barreto v. Portugal, App. No. 18072/91, 1995 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 
355 (Eur. Ct. H.R.). 
 148 Spadea v. Italy, App. No. 12868/87, 21 Eur. H.R. Rep. 482 (1996). 
 149 In civil law systems, property owners are afforded the right to use the items 
they own, or to derive the fruits of them.  But perhaps the most important feature of 
true ownership is the right of the owner to dispose of that which he owns in any 
manner he sees fit.  1 MARCEL PLANIOL, TRAITÉ ÉLÉMENTARIE DE DROIT CIVIL [TREATISE 
ON THE CIVIL LAW] pt. 2, No. 2332, at 380 (Louisiana State Law Inst. trans. 1959) 
(1939) (“That which characterizes the right of ownership . . . is the power of dispos-
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rental units with “sitting tenants” that may only be evicted for good 
cause typically brings thirty to forty percent less than their vacant 
counterparts.150  The financial effect of a landlord’s assumption of a 
rental subject to the good cause eviction requirement—particularly in 
a case like Scollo, where no rent was paid for more than seven 
years151—is astoundingly discouraging.152  Of course, these conse-
quences also stymie other would-be investors.153
Even beyond the significant and direct financial disincentive im-
posed by a good cause eviction requirement, there is a more subtle 
and emotional disincentive.  The mere “fear of being unable to evict 
a disliked tenant,” even after the initial term of the landlord-tenant 
relationship has expired, has been referred to as a “potential loss of 
psychic income.”154  This emotional consideration has been shown to 
be nearly as significant to landlords as financial ones.155  British land-
lords, for instance, typically express a greater dissatisfaction with se-
curity of tenure provisions than they do with their rent control coun-
terparts.156
ing of the thing, by consuming it, by physically destroying it and by transforming its 
substance.”). 
 150 Immobiliare Saffi v. Italy, App. No. 22774/93, 30 Eur. H.R. Rep. 756, 778 
(1999). 
 151 Scollo v. Italy, App. No. 19133/91, 22 Eur. H.R. Rep. 514 (1996) (Eur. Ct. 
H.R.). 
 152 The Scollo facts are not confined to Italy.  They could easily be duplicated in 
the United States.  Extreme tenant protection has resulted in making eviction ex-
tremely difficult for landlords, even where their tenants have stopped paying rent.  
PETER D. SALINS, THE ECOLOGY OF HOUSING DESTRUCTION 73 (1980).  In this way, the 
rules of tenancy depart from almost every other contractual relationship known to 
the law.  In other sale and lease transactions, payment of the price is a necessary 
component of the relationship between the parties.  The merchandise provided must 
also be of a certain quality.  But if it falls short, the remedy is “an annulment of the 
transaction.”  Id. at 74.  Buyer receives a return of the price and seller gets the good 
back.  “Under almost no circumstances is the remedy for an unsatisfied pur-
chaser/lessee the continued enjoyment of the ‘flawed’ good or service for free.”  Id. 
 153 But see Kenneth K. Baar, Would the Abolition of Rent Controls Restore a Free Market?, 
54 BROOK. L. REV. 1231, 1232–33 (1989) (suggesting that the empirical evidence on 
the effect of rent control on supply is varied).  A few studies have found “no correla-
tion between rent controls and the volume of apartment construction.”  Id. at 1233. 
 154 Lee, supra note 143, at 551. 
 155 See JOHN ALLEN & LINDA MCDOWELL, LANDLORDS AND PROPERTY 43 (1989).  Evi-
dence submitted to Britain’s Environment Committee indicated that small landlords 
(of which there were over 500,000) considered security of tenure legislation to be a 
“major influence” upon their decision to rent residential property.  Id. 
 156 Likewise, studies demonstrate that security of tenure “is the single most impor-
tant determinant of housing demand for all households, overshadowing the impor-
tance of both the quality of structures and the amount of living space.”  See ANGEL, 
supra note 143, at 315; see generally Axel Börsch-Supan, Econometric Analysis of Discrete 
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Second, the illiquidity of a rental home burdened by good cause 
eviction requirements dissuades investors.  Real estate investors are 
more likely interested in a long-term, stable investment than are in-
vestors in, for instance, the stock market.157  But even real estate inves-
tors typically desire a somewhat fleeting arrangement.  The illiquidity 
resulting from good cause eviction rules and the “problem of gaining 
access to the capital [invested] at the most opportune time may be 
sufficient to dissuade” even the most committed investor.158  The on-
going, near perpetual nature of a lease subject to a good cause evic-
tion rule deprives the landlord of the ability to sell at a “vacant pos-
session price,”159 effectively controlling his ability to exit as owner.  
Limiting the potential investor’s exit opportunities in such an ex-
treme way is not only theoretically objectionable, but is practically 
unworkable.160  When investment in an uncontrolled (or, at least, 
more reasonably controlled) private market (including the stock 
market, for instance) is easily and readily available, there simply is not 
sufficient incentive for investors to turn to the housing market.  A fo-
cus on other investments makes more sense. 
Good cause eviction requirements, then, certainly discourage in-
vestment in the market for rental housing, either through the pur-
chase of existing dwellings devoted to rental or through the construc-
tion of new rental dwellings.  But the rules may do even greater 
damage by depleting the existing rental housing stock.  In light of the 
negative financial and emotional constraints outlined above, land-
lords newly faced with good cause eviction requirements tend to opt 
for conversion of their rental dwellings at the earliest possible oppor-
tunity.161  They will convert their rental properties to alternative, 
Choice with Applications on the Demand for Housing in the U.S. and West Germany, 296 
LECTURE NOTES IN ECONOMICS AND MATHEMATICAL SYSTEMS 118 (1987). 
 157 A 1995 survey of private property owners and managers revealed that their 
primary reason for acquiring rental property was to earn rental income (for small 
property owners) and long-term capital gains (for medium and large-scale property 
owners).  HOWARD SAVAGE, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, WHAT WE HAVE LEARNED ABOUT 
PROPERTIES, OWNERS, AND TENANTS FROM THE 1995 PROPERTY OWNERS AND MANAGERS 
SURVEY 1 (1998), http://www.census.gov/prod/3/98pubs/h121-9801.pdf. 
 158 See Lee, supra note 143, at 552; see also HAROLD L. WOLMAN, HOUSING AND 
HOUSING POLICY IN THE U.S. AND U.K. 63 (1975). 
 159 KARN & WOLMAN, supra note 3, at 144. 
 160 See Hanoch Dagan & Michael A. Heller, The Liberal Commons, 110 YALE L.J. 549, 
567–70 (2001) (property regimes that make “exit impractical . . . or that unreasona-
bly delay exit [are] incompatible with the most fundamental liberal tenets”). 
 161 See Epstein, supra note 144, at 763–64.  Of course, since a tenant typically may 
not be evicted because of the landlord’s conversion desires, the landlord must often 
wait for the existing tenant to voluntarily vacate the premises.  See WOLMAN, supra 
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higher-value uses in order to reap larger returns on their often sig-
nificant financial investments.  This may involve converting the prop-
erty into a dwelling for their own use, or perhaps converting it into 
condominium living.162  Good cause eviction requirements create in-
centives for such conversions by diminishing the value of investments 
in rental housing and thereby decreasing existing rental stock.  The 
regulation, therefore, causes the very depletion of housing that it at-
tempts to remedy.163
The United Kingdom’s experience with good cause eviction and 
rent control nicely illustrates investor reaction to the disposal and il-
liquidity effects of those legal rules.164  Long periods of good cause 
eviction accompanied by rent control there have “progressively para-
lyzed the supply of houses for rent and perpetuated shortage.”165  The 
percentage of British households accommodated by the rental hous-
ing market plummeted from ninety percent to less than seven per-
note 158, at 63 (landlord desiring to convert must either “bribe” existing tenants to 
move or wait for them to leave voluntarily). 
 162 See Epstein, supra note 144, at 765; see also Louis M. Rea & Dipak K. Gupta, The 
Rent Control Controversy: A Consideration of The California Experience, 4 GLENDALE L. REV. 
105, 134 (1981).  Many cities have enacted ordinances curtailing the rights of prop-
erty owners to convert property to condominiums.  For example, Pleasanton, Cali-
fornia, passed a 2006 ordinance requiring any person seeking to convert rental 
property into condominiums to grant a right of first refusal to low income tenants.  
PLEASANTON, CAL., CODE § 17.04.100 (2007), available at 
http://qcode.us/codes/pleasanton.  The law further provides that very low income 
tenants have the right to continue their existing leases for nine years from the date of 
notice of intended conversion.  Id.  These rules were established to “minimize or 
avoid the hardship caused by the displacement of tenants.”  Id. § 17.04.030.  San 
Francisco regulates condominium conversion through a lottery system under which 
only 200 units per year are allowed to be converted.  SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., 
SUBDIVISION CODE § 1396.1 (2007).  In addition to providing such a small number of 
conversions, the Code provides that landlords must provide for temporary tenant re-
location and must bear the cost of moving expenses for any tenant.  Id. §§ 1392–1393.  
Applications to the conversion lottery are prohibited if a landlord has had two or 
more evictions after May 2005 or even one eviction, if it involved a senior citizen, dis-
abled person, or catastrophically ill tenant.  Id. § 1396.2. 
 163 See, e.g., Thomas S. Nesslein, Market versus Planning: An Assessment of the Swedish 
Housing Model in the Post-war Period, 40 URB. STUDIES 1259, 1269 (2003). 
 164 The British first adopted good cause eviction rules (along with rent control) in 
the early twentieth century as a measure to remedy housing shortages caused by 
World War I.  And although their tenancy rules have changed rather dramatically 
since, good cause eviction remains as a key feature of the United Kingdom’s tenancy 
regime.  THE LAW COMMISSION, CONSULTATION PAPER NO. 162, RENTING HOMES 1: 
STATUS AND SECURITY 23, 51–52 (2002), available at http://www.lawcom.gov. 
uk/docs/cp162.pdf [hereinafter RENTING HOMES]; see generally DAVID HUGHES ET AL., 
TEXT AND MATERIALS ON HOUSING LAW 118–56 (2005). 
 165 STAFFORD, supra note 18, at 114. 
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cent after the adoption of a good cause eviction scheme.166  The pur-
ported solutions to the severe housing shortage in the United King-
dom have only encouraged landlords to keep their flats empty167 or to 
make altogether different investments.  In the wake of its good cause 
eviction rules, England has seen significant occurrence of empty 
property, a record number of homeless, and slow-rising capital re-
turns.168  All of these effects can be attributed to a widening of the 
supply-demand gap that should have been anticipated.  Restricting a 
landlord’s right to such an extreme degree will necessarily disincen-
tivize him from supplying his social good, exacerbating the problem 
of an already low supply.  Good cause eviction as a solution for reme-
dying low supply fails because it “contravene[es basic] micro-
economic rules of supply and demand.”169
If a state is going to reduce private profit and thereby diminish 
speculative activity in the rental market, its only hope of not realizing 
a perpetuation of the low supply problem would come with increased 
state production of housing.170  The market effect of disincentivizing 
individual investment activity creates a need for the state to play a 
substantial role in the production of new housing.171  Historically, 
governments have shied away from performing such functions—
either because of the significant resources required to competitively 
supply adequate housing or because of concern that, for political rea-
sons, such activities are best left to the free market.172  And where 
government has attempted to remedy low supply through its own in-
 166 Ray Forrest & Alan Murie, Restructuring the Welfare State: Privatization of Public 
Housing in Britain, in HOUSING NEEDS & POLICY APPROACHES: TRENDS IN THIRTEEN 
COUNTRIES 97–109 (Willem van Vilet et al. eds., 1985). 
 167 WOLMAN, supra note 158, at 63. 
 168 STAFFORD, supra note 18, at 114. 
 169 Salins, supra note 12, at 775. 
 170 See generally LEONARD SILK, SWEDEN PLANS FOR BETTER HOUSING 74–83 (1948).  
The French government, for example, to make good on its promise to provide ade-
quate housing to all its citizens, plans to produce over 120,000 housing units per year 
for the next five years.  See French PM Vows, supra note 6. 
 171 The risk extends beyond the tenants subject to good cause eviction.  See gener-
ally Michael Schill, Comment on Chester Hartman and David Robinson’s “Evictions: The 
Hidden Housing Problem,” 14 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 503, 506 (2003).  Schill argues 
that tenancy restrictions like rent control can also have a negative impact on non-
rent controlled tenants of the landlord.  According to Schill, a landlord who can 
make up for decreased rent from one tenant by increasing that collected from an-
other likely will.  And where this is not possible, he is likely to cut back maintenance 
of all his holdings, and possibly even abandon the property.  Id. 
 172 ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 540 (R.H. Campbell ed., Oxford Univ. 
Press 1979) (1776) (describing the struggle between free market capitalism and gov-
ernment regulation). 
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volvement in housing production, the results have been disappoint-
ing at best. 
Sweden provides the clearest illustration of a failed government 
control model.173  To rectify shortages in the wake of World War II, 
Sweden opted for government regulation of all features of housing 
production, including the type and cost of housing construction.174  
The idea was that housing shortages were caused, at least in part, by 
excessive construction costs and that government control could solve 
that problem and thereby reduce costs to tenants.175  To effectuate 
this shift, the Swedish government controlled rents, imposed a good 
cause eviction scheme, and controlled production with subsidized fi-
nancing.176  Unfortunately, however, pushing housing construction 
out of the capitalistic market and essentially creating a “socialist hous-
ing market”177 has caused building costs to skyrocket to untenable 
rates.178  Rising costs are not the only failure of the system.  Socioeco-
nomic segregation in Sweden is worse than ever.179  The Swedish gov-
ernment assumed that simultaneous controls of rent and production 
 173 See Nesslein, supra note 163, at 1269; see generally Deborah Kenn, One Nation’s 
Dream, Another’s Reality: Housing Justice in Sweden, 22 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 63 (1996) (de-
scribing Sweden’s good cause eviction regime). 
 174 Kenn, supra note 173, at 80–81. 
 175 Id.; see also Nesslein, supra note 163, at 1270. 
 176 Nesslein, supra note 163, at 1262. 
 177 Kenn, supra note 173, at 80. 
 178 Nesslein, supra note 163, at 1270.  By 1985, Swedish housing costs were re-
ported to be forty-three percent above the average of those of other European coun-
tries and thirty-five percent above those of the United States.  Id.  By 1990, those 
building costs had increased to twice as high as those in the United States.  Id.  As of 
the mid-1990s, Swedish housing costs were still twice as high as those in this country, 
even after adjusting building costs for the economies of scale associated with larger 
housing square footage in the United States.  Id. at 1271.  This disparity is thought to 
be caused, in part, both by the lack of competition in the construction industry and 
by the development of “special economic-interest groups,” including construction 
and building materials firms, housing bureaucracy groups, municipal housing com-
panies, and national housing cooperatives.  Id.  These groups have an economic in-
centive to “subsidi[ze] away” rising building costs in order to support” otherwise non-
economically viable new construction.  Id.  In contrast, the American, largely free-
market housing system has generated construction costs considered to be the lowest 
among high-income countries.  Id. at 1265.  Housing costs per square meter, as of 
1990, according to the Global Housing Indicators Program were:  (1) Japan–$2604; 
(2) Finland–$1734; (3) Sweden–$1527; (4) Norway–$1426; (5) Germany–$1305; and 
(6) the United States–$500.  Id. 
 179 Id. at 1274.  In 1997, a Swedish government investigation revealed that in the 
country’s three largest cities—Stockholm, Gothenburg, and Malmo—class segrega-
tion was more pronounced than it had been at any time during the pre-War period.  
Id.  In those areas, unemployment often exceeds fifty percent.  Id.  The study noted 
that residential segregation had begun to overlap with social and ethnic segregation.  
Id. 
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would provide housing opportunities to all income groups and elimi-
nate segregation by ethnicity and socioeconomic status, but quite the 
opposite has resulted.180  All in all, most housing experts and econo-
mists agree that the Swedish model has not worked and should not 
be emulated.181
The result of good cause eviction rules is somewhat of a Catch-
22: The rules necessarily perpetuate, if not overtly cause, housing 
shortages.182  But if the government steps in to remedy that shortage 
by controlling the construction market, the high costs that result 
cause the housing market to further suffer.183  The only real solution 
is to avoid the Catch-22 by rejecting good cause eviction require-
ments altogether.  The free market for rental housing certainly has its 
flaws, but none so great as those resulting from good cause eviction 
schemes that seek to remedy them.184
B. Decreasing the Quality of Existing Rental Housing 
Even beyond the serious supply problem that rules requiring 
good cause for tenant eviction create, there is a more fundamental 
problem with the theory.  The trend in the post-World War era is to 
impose good cause eviction as a sort of measure to guarantee the 
right of quality, affordable housing to all mankind.185  But the effect 
 180 Id. at 1273–74. 
 181 Id. at 1277 (“The general lesson is that both theory and much real-world evi-
dence strongly suggest that the Swedish model is not a model that should be emu-
lated in the search for equitable and efficient housing outcomes.”).  But see Kenn, 
supra note 173, at 63 (lauding the Swedish system as an “available prototype” for the 
United States). 
 182 At least one author has found rent control, which almost necessarily includes a 
good cause eviction rule, to be the most significant predictor of homelessness.  See 
William Tucker, Where do the Homeless Come From?, NAT’L REV., Sept. 25, 1987, at 41. 
 183 Shlomo Angel, in his excellent work on global housing policy, has character-
ized the debate as one between enabling and nonenabling government intervention 
and has aptly noted that “[n]either laissez faire nor the centrally planned economy 
have survived the test of time.”  ANGEL, supra note 143, at 13. 
 184 See generally Lenore Schloming & Skip Schloming, Comment on Chester Hartman 
and David Robinson’s “Evictions: The Hidden Housing Problem,” 14 HOUSING POL’Y 
DEBATE 529 (2003).  According to the Schlomings, who are President and Executive 
Director of the Small Property Owners Association, rental housing is an exceptionally 
un-monopolistic market.  Id. at 536.  Using 1990 Census data, the authors estimate 
that seventy-five percent of rental housing is owned, not by large investors, but by 
small-scale landlords.  Id.  “No business sector in the country has as many owners, 
with holdings inversely small. . . . The natural searching and matching of owners to 
tenants in such a highly diversified market is freedom itself, with the desire to find 
good owners/good tenants constraining both sides to behave themselves.”  Id. 
 185 See BELG. CONST. art. 23 (describing constitutional and legislative “rights to 
housing” in several nations). 
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of imposing good cause eviction requirements, ironically, is to actu-
ally decrease the quality of rental housing. 
Good cause eviction requirements insure stability for tenants 
and, particularly if they are accompanied by rent control, tend to 
push tenants toward maintaining their status quo as renters rather 
than purchasing their own homes.  Well-respected sociological re-
search demonstrates that people simply do not care for items they are 
using in the same manner as items they own.186  The incentives good 
cause eviction requirements create for tenants, therefore, serve to 
lessen the continuing quality of the premises they occupy. 
Further, the necessarily lengthy term of leases with good cause 
eviction requirements increases the dilapidation of rental housing by 
increasing costs and narrowing the landlord’s rate of return.187  Faced 
with a significantly less profitable investment, a landlord is likely to 
make only those repairs absolutely required, to do so in the cheapest 
manner possible, and to do so only when forced.188  Continued main-
tenance of rental property simply becomes increasingly unprofitable 
under a good cause eviction scheme.189  Likewise, the landlord is 
 186 Even in long term rental situations, property owners are the only parties with a 
stake in maintaining the value of their property, and thus they are the parties most 
likely to take steps to preserve that value.  See, e.g., ANGEL, supra note 143, at 85. 
 187 In Sweden, for instance, researchers have found that rental housing consists 
primarily of highly dense spaces, “monotonous in design and with little attractive 
landscaping,” that because of lack of maintenance and “problem tenants” has fallen 
into serious disrepair.  Nesslein, supra note 163, at 1266. 
 188 See, e.g., Cheung, supra note 144, at 61; Schloming & Schloming, supra note 
184, at 533 (describing small property owners, the paradigmatic low-cost housing 
owner, as blue collar individuals, “typically just one to two steps above their tenants 
on the income scale,” who often self-maintain and  “delay costly capital improve-
ments as long as possible[, nursing] a leaky roof and old plumbing along to squeeze 
out a few more years of life before spending big bucks”). 
 189 George Sternlieb described well the reality of the landlord’s dwindling returns 
to the United States House of Representatives in 1971: 
     One of the most satisfying figments of folklore in our times is the 
portrait of the slum landlord.  A typical vision is that of the central city 
slums being the fiefdom of a small group of large investors.  The latter 
in turn grow very fat indeed on the high rents and low input which 
their tenants and buildings are subjected to. 
     I have called it a satisfying illusion because it has in turn permitted 
us the belief that all that is required in low-income housing was a repar-
titioning of an already adequate rent pie.  Whether through code en-
forcement, rent controls, or any of a host of other mechanisms, the 
problem of good maintenance could be resolved by squeezing some of 
the excess profits out of landlords’ hands.  This process would still 
leave enough of a residue to maintain his self-interests in the longevity 
and satisfactory quality of the structure in question. 
     This bit of folklore may have had considerable validity a decade or 
two ago.  It has little relationship to the realities currently. 
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highly unlikely to take any steps to improve the premises (beyond 
merely “repairing” that which is broken) under such a scheme.190  
The illiquidity of the rental housing as an asset and the very length of 
time inherent in the investment would prevent or, at the very least, 
substantially diminish, the landlord’s ability to ever realize the gains 
of improving the housing.191  And so, once again, good cause eviction 
requirements, by disincentivizing landlords from repairing and im-
proving the land they own, tend to diminish the overall stock of qual-
ity rental housing.192
C. Encouraging Inefficient Housing Allocation 
It is well-established that rent control encourages inefficient al-
location of housing.  Specifically, it encourages tenants to over-
consume space and stay in places they neither need nor would be 
able to afford absent regulation of the rent.193  Good cause eviction 
requirements also necessarily entail this problem.  In fact, a tenancy 
scheme adopting good cause eviction compounds it; essentially, the 
risk under such a regime is magnified, as it exists both at the high 
and low ends of the scale. 
Lease contracts with a good cause eviction requirement are typi-
cally required to have a somewhat lengthy term.194  Indeed, the good 
cause component would not offer the tenant the protection for which 
the scheme is designed if the parties were permitted to perfect a lease 
contract for an exceptionally short term.  The combination, then, of 
the tenant security that comes with a good cause eviction require-
ment, the lengthy term of the lease, and the likelihood that rent con-
trol exists will, at the very least, encourage tenants to stay in the prem-
Abandonment and Rehabilitation: What is to be Done?, Papers Submitted to the Committee on 
Banking and Currency, 92d Cong. 315, 316–317 (1971) (statement of George 
Sternlieb).  See WOLMAN, supra note 158, at 66; see also KARN & WOLMAN, supra note 3, 
at 144 (British landlords attempted to rectify the negative effects of rent control 
through undermaintenance). 
 190 SALINS, supra note 152, at 92–93. 
 191 Lee, supra note 143, at 551–52. 
 192 See, e.g., David Kiefer, Housing Deterioration, Housing Codes, and Rent Control, 17 
URB. STUDIES 53, 54 (1980); see also Salins, supra note 12, at 777 n.10. 
 193 Nesslein, supra note 163, at 1268; Lee, supra note 143, at 546; see also Epstein, 
supra note 144, at 762 (noting that a wealth test, which relies on ability to pay, better 
matches persons with available premises, “with a minimum of fuss, bother, and po-
litical intrigue”). 
 194 Italian residential lease contracts may not be established for less than four 
years.  French tenants have the right to a three-year minimum lease.  Fixed duration 
lease contracts are generally not allowed at all in Germany.  See supra notes 86, 130, 
and 139 and accompanying text. 
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ises longer than they otherwise might.  As the tenant’s family struc-
ture changes—either expanding or contracting—the tenant remains 
stagnant.  For the sector of society subject to a controlled tenancy re-
gime, “inefficient distribution of housing consumption” results.195  
While rent control encourages tenants to over-consume, keeping a 
larger apartment than necessary because of artificially low rent, a 
good cause eviction requirement encourages both over- and under-
consumption to avoid leaving the security of an existing tenancy for 
the highly uncertain prospect of more suitable housing. 
Moreover, the ridiculously high transaction costs and lengthy 
wait that typically befall those renters seeking increased space stands 
as a “substantial impediment to a household’s ability to raise [its] 
housing standard.”196  The Swedish rental housing market, for in-
stance, is plagued by significant difficulties in tenant mobility.  Gov-
ernment control over housing production without sufficient market-
based information has resulted in a significant concentration of “av-
erage-sized rental dwellings.”197  Ninety percent of the rental units in 
Sweden have only three bedrooms.198  Upgrading to a dwelling with 
the needed space proves impossible, or exceptionally onerous, for 
many families. 
The effect of a non-market-driven and inefficient allocation of 
rental housing is somewhat staggering.  Substantial waste is created 
under such a scheme, because new and appropriately-sized housing 
must be constructed for families not able to find adequate vacant 
housing.  A 1990 study of the Swedish rental housing market  
estimated that if a small proportion of elderly Swedish households 
relinquished their dwellings to larger families, the volume of con-
struction could be reduced substantially.  Over a twenty-year pe-
riod, it was estimated that it would be possible to reduce new con-
struction by . . . roughly eighteen percent of total housing 
production . . . .199  
In an increasingly populated world,200 such results should be pursued.  
Achieving efficiency in housing allocation will serve to ensure that the 
 195 Nesslein, supra note 163, at 1268 (referring to rent regulation only). 
 196 Id.  
 197 Id. at 1268–69. 
 198 Id. at 1269.  When compared with the fact that more than half of Swedish 
owner-occupied homes have five bedrooms, this evidence is quite telling.  Id. 
 199 Id. at 1268. 
 200 According to 1998 estimates and projections of the United Nations, the world 
population is growing at 1.33 percent per year, an annual net addition of about 78 
million people. World population in the mid-twenty-first century is expected to be in 
the range of 7.3 to 10.7 billion and likely, by 2050, 8.9 billion.  World Population Nears 
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goal of a housing policy that supports a good cause eviction 
scheme—namely, providing adequate housing for all—is met.201
D. Pushing Tenancies into the Black Market 
There is one significant practical effect of good cause eviction 
limitations that is almost certainly unintended, and likely unantici-
pated, by proponents of the rules.  The evidence shows that the sig-
nificant disadvantages of good cause eviction schemes often cause 
landlords to seek more workable alternatives elsewhere.  The result is 
a movement away from legal tenancy regimes altogether and into 
other, less desirable, relationships. 
In some cases, potential landlords disappointed with the effect 
of a mandatory good cause eviction scheme have chosen to reject 
tenancy in favor of an unlawful, totally uncontrolled, and even un-
taxed, “black market” relationship.  Poland, for instance, has had a 
problem with the proliferation of black market tenancies in the wake 
of the adoption of a good cause eviction regime.202  The parties to 
such a relationship essentially attempt to operate outside the bounds 
of the law altogether, foregoing every benefit of a legal constraint 
upon both landlord and tenant.203
Even in American jurisdictions with good cause eviction schemes 
such black markets have emerged, though in a slightly less extreme 
fashion than that seen in Poland.  In New York, the passage of rent 
control, along with good cause eviction limitations, has led to “brib-
ery and under-the-table payments.”204  “Key money” arrangements 
have developed elsewhere whereby the landlord agrees to give the 
tenant the protection mandated under a legal tenancy regime, but 
requires him to pay an upfront fee for the privilege.205  In these brib-
ery and key money cases, the tenant may actually receive some of the 
Six Billion, U.N. CHRON., November 4, 1998, available at http://www.un.org/Pubs/ 
chronicle/1998/issue4/498p33.htm. 
 201 Lawrence C. Becker, Rent Control is Not a Taking, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 1215, 1218 
(1989). 
 202 See GROMNICKA & ZYSK, supra note 142, at 30. 
 203 Id. 
 204 Rea & Gupta, supra note 162, at 132. 
 205 See Cheung, supra note 143, at 63.  For example, after restricting the right of 
landlords to set or alter rent levels, the British government felt compelled to enact 
the Increase of Rent and Mortgage Interest (Restrictions) Act 1920, making the de-
mand of “key money” payments and other bribes a criminal offense.  RENTING 
HOMES, supra note 164, at 23; see also Epstein, supra note 144, at 741 (relating an ex-
perience wherein he lost a “steal” of an apartment because, in his naiveté, he did not 
know that the building superintendent “needed to have his palm smeared”). 
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benefits of a legal tenancy regime, but only upon being forced to pay 
a sum for which he is not legally obligated. 
In other jurisdictions, landlords have not gone so far as to at-
tempt to establish an extra-legal relationship, but rather have pur-
posefully attempted to avoid the legal tenancy regime in favor of a 
different legal bond.  In the United Kingdom, for example, a good 
cause eviction scheme layered over rent control has led to a prevalent 
practice on the part of owners to offer occupants “licenses” rather 
than leases.206  These owners “hoped [the licenses] might fall outside 
the scope of the [tenancy] legislation, so that their properties were 
not subject to rent regulation and their occupiers did not have long-
term security of tenure.”207  The license attempts have sometimes 
been successful in avoiding the salient features of the tenancy regime, 
and sometimes not.208  Regardless of the outcome, however, these at-
tempts at circumventing the appropriate legal relationship have been 
exceptionally expensive to the taxpayer, who is left holding the bag 
for judicial resources expended to enforce the good cause eviction 
scheme adopted by his legislators.209
E. Increasing Litigation 
The pragmatic effect of good cause eviction requirements on the 
judicial system is substantial and negative.  Such a regime tends to in-
crease litigation between landlords and tenants in a number of ways.  
For example, the good cause eviction requirement gives the landlord 
an incentive to exploit relatively minor tenant breaches of contract.  
In a free market for rental housing, landlords are likely to overlook 
small tenant infractions, as pursuing eviction is time-consuming, ex-
pensive, and unlikely to provide much long-term benefit.210  Where 
the tenant is paying the market rate, the gains for the landlord are 
likely to be minimal.211  At best, the landlord will reap minor finan-
cial, though perhaps slightly more substantial emotional, reward if he 
 206 See RENTING HOMES, supra note 164, at 28. 
 207 Id. 
 208 Compare A.G. Securities v. Vaughan, [1990] 1 A.C. 417 (H.L.), with Street v. 
Mountford, [1985] A.C. 809 (H.L.). 
 209 See Edgar Olsen, An Econometric Analysis of Rent Control, 80 J. POL. ECON. 1081, 
1087 (1972). 
 210 Epstein, supra note 144, at 764. 
 211 See id.; see also AIMCO Properties, L.L.C. v. Dziewisz, 883 A.2d 310, 313 (N.H. 
2005) (“Replacing one tenant upon the expiration of a lease with another tenant 
who will pay the same rent and occupy the same position as the tenant being evicted 
does not, in and of itself, provide the landlord of restricted property with any eco-
nomic or business advantage.”). 
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dislikes his tenant.  In a heavily regulated tenancy regime, however, 
the situation is quite different.  Faced with an exceptionally long term 
lease, very likely an artificially-fixed low rent, and the inability to end 
the relationship absent good cause, the landlord is likely to look for 
that good cause wherever the slightest possibility of establishing it ex-
ists.212  The possibility of construing minor tenant infractions as “good 
cause” for eviction gives the landlord an escape valve where before 
there was none.  “Removal for cause typically allows the landlord to 
recapture a substantial portion of the unit’s value . . . by removing the 
unit from controls by ‘rehabbing’ it, or by selling it as a condomin-
ium.”213  With the parties no longer willing or able to resolve their 
disputes informally, courts must take on the added responsibility.214
Moreover, rules requiring good cause for tenant eviction neces-
sarily expand the court’s role in policing the landlord-tenant rela-
tionship to prevent the tenant harassment that is more likely to flow 
under a good cause eviction scheme than under a free market.215  
Where the landlord is desperate to end the lease and remedy a sink-
ing investment, the good cause eviction scheme may leave him little 
hope.  His inability to dispose of the property at will, particularly if he 
finds no tenant misconduct to rely upon, certainly encourages him to 
take any and all necessary steps to induce the tenant to leave volun-
tarily.  Tenant harassment may result.216
The costs of enforcing a rent control regime in New York for just 
one year—1968—were estimated at $270 million, “a cost which was 
borne by the taxpayers.”217  Such increased cost and workload is a 
 212 Epstein, supra note 144, at 764. 
 213 Id. at 765. 
 214 Id.; see also Schloming & Scholoming, supra note 184, at 532 (noting that the 
eviction proceeding, which was originally supposed to be a quick, summary proceed-
ing to regain possession of one’s property, “has been turned into a potentially very 
lengthy one by letting tenants or their lawyers file counterclaims against the owners 
as part of the eviction process itself,” in effect prolonging litigation). 
 215 See Lee, supra note 143, at 551. 
 216 The most notorious example of such tenant harassment was that perpetrated 
by Perec Rachman, a British landlord in the 1950s.  Rachman handled tenants he 
found unprofitable by either offering them cash to vacate, making their lives intoler-
able with loud music blaring at all hours of the night, or by cutting off their utilities 
and/or damaging their plumbing.  Rachman’s ill practices became so well known 
that inappropriate behavior by landlords has since been dubbed “Rachmanism.”  
RENTING HOMES, supra note 164, at 25 n.22; see Dave Cowan & Alex Marsh, There’s 
Regulatory Crime, and then There’s Landlord Crime: from ‘Rachmanites’ to ‘Partners’, 64 
MOD. L. REV. 831, 837 (2001) (debates about Rachman’s shenanigans were partly re-
sponsible for the rise of the Labour Party which enacted Britain’s “emergency” hous-
ing legislation). 
 217 See Olsen, supra note 209, at 1089–95; see also Rea & Gupta, supra note 162, at 
132 n.81. 
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problem that both the legislatures and the courts of jurisdictions 
propounding good cause eviction tenancy schemes must be prepared 
to handle. 
IV. THE DISTURBING INVASION OF GOOD  
CAUSE EVICTION IN THE UNITED STATES 
If the phenomenon of limiting tenant evictions to situations in 
which the landlord can demonstrate good cause were limited to the 
European countries, we might write the development off as a rela-
tively benign one.  Indeed, American and European laws, particularly 
those concerning property, are quite different and developments in 
one region often do not carry over elsewhere.218  Unfortunately, how-
ever, this is not true of good cause eviction requirements.  Although 
their acceptance in the United States does not come close to rivaling 
that of their European counterparts, good cause eviction require-
ments are increasingly creeping into the law of the American states. 
The sources of and rationale for adoption of good cause eviction 
requirements in this country have been varied.  But more and more, 
they are beginning to reflect what could be characterized as the 
European view—that tenant eviction must be limited to good cause to 
honor a social policy—the right to decent housing for all individuals.  
This view first permeated the public housing market.  But today it has 
crept into even the market for private housing, and thus constrains 
landlords who lease with no governmental involvement. 
A. In the Public and “Quasi-Public” Housing Sectors 
Public housing markets have long subjected the federal govern-
ment landlord to stringent requirements not applicable to landlords 
in the private market.219  The rationale is that public housing is a 
form of welfare from the federal government, one to which the re-
cipient is entitled.220  This entitlement gives rise to a property interest, 
which is protected under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
 218 Andrea B. Carroll, Examining a Comparative Law Myth: Two Hundred Years of Ri-
parian Misconception, 80 TUL. L. REV. 901, 943 (2006) (noting differences between civil 
and common law property schemes). 
 219 Marc Jolin, Good Cause Eviction and the Low Income Housing Tax Credit, 67 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 521, 521–22  (2000). 
 220 Joy v. Daniels, 479 F.2d 1236, 1242 (4th Cir. 1973); see also Ressler v. Pierce, 692 
F.2d 1212, 1215 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that Section 8 program tenants held consti-
tutionally protected property rights); Jeffries v. Ga. Residential Fin. Auth., 678 F.2d 
919, 925 (11th Cir. 1982). 
CARROLL_FINAL 3/30/2008  1:43:04 PM 
462 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:427 
 
Amendment.221  The government may not, therefore, evict a public 
housing tenant at will.222  The federal courts have held that evicting a 
tenant from public housing merely because his lease expired would 
infringe upon the “property interest” the tenant has to continue re-
ceiving his entitlement until there is cause to deprive him of it.223  In 
the public housing context, then, the landlord—the federal govern-
ment—has subjected itself to a prohibition on evictions absent good 
cause. 
This prerequisite of good cause to evict has been extended be-
yond traditional public housing—that owned by the federal govern-
ment—and now applies equally to “quasi-public” landlords.  Where 
“the federal government has so far insinuated itself into a position of 
interdependence with the landlord that it must be recognized as a 
joint participant in the landlord-tenant relationship,”224 the landlord 
is “quasi-public” and also constrained by the good cause eviction 
rules.225  Such a situation exists, for instance, where the government 
partly finances the construction of private housing,226 offers tax 
breaks or mortgage interest rate reductions for the construction of 
low-income housing,227 or subsidizes tenant rent.228  “Section 8” hous-
ing is the most well-known program of this type,229 and even before its 
written provisions expressly restricted landlords to evictions for good 
 221 See Joy, 479 F.2d at 1241; see also Swann v. Gastonia Hous. Auth., 675 F.2d 1342, 
1346 (4th Cir. 1982) (Section 8 statutory “good cause” eviction requirements impli-
cate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 222 Housing and Urban Development Termination of Tenancy and Modification 
of Lease, 24 C.F.R. § 880.607 (2007).  Section 880.607(b)(1)(iv) provides that “no 
termination by an owner will be valid to the extent it is based upon a lease or a provi-
sion of State law permitting termination of a tenancy solely because of expiration of 
an initial or subsequent renewal term.”  Id. (emphasis added).  The good cause pro-
visions in § 880.607 apply to the Section 8 Housing Assistance Program, Section 202 
Direct Loan Program, Section 202 Supportive Housing for the Elderly Program, and 
Section 811 Supportive Housing for Persons with Disabilities Program.  In addition 
to providing specific grounds for termination, the regulations provide that eviction 
for “other good cause” cannot occur unless the landlord has first provided prior no-
tice of the offensive behavior to the tenant.  24 C.F.R. § 880.607(b)(2). 
 223 Joy, 479 F.2d at 1241. 
 224 Green v. Copperstone Ltd. P’ship, 346 A.2d 686, 697 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 
1975). 
 225 Joy, 479 F.2d at 1242. 
 226 Green, 346 A.2d at 695. 
 227 Id. 
 228 Edward H. Rabin, The Revolution in Residential Landlord-Tenant Law: Causes and 
Consequences, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 517, 535 (1983). 
 229 See 24 C.F.R. § 880 (2007).  The Section 8 program aims to provide low-income 
families with “decent, safe and sanitary rental housing through the use of a system of 
housing assistance payments” paid to public or private housing owners.  Id. 
§ 880.101(a). 
CARROLL_FINAL 3/30/2008  1:43:04 PM 
2008] GOOD CAUSE EVICTION 463 
 
cause, several courts of appeals held that such an interpretation was 
necessary in light of the property interests held by the tenant.230  The 
intrusion upon the rights of the landlord is significant, but logical 
where the landlord has depended upon the aid of the federal gov-
ernment to achieve or maintain his status.  In these “quasi-public” 
situations, it is still the federal government that can fairly be called 
the landlord.231
Courts in this country typically hold both public and quasi-public 
landlords to a good cause eviction standard because they view it as 
the only possibility for meeting a social goal.  Congress articulated 
that “national goal” in the Housing and Urban Development Act to 
be “a decent home and suitable living environment for every Ameri-
can family.”232  The good cause eviction requirement, it was hoped, 
would insure “adequate, safe and sanitary quarters” and “an atmos-
phere of stability, security, neighborliness, and social justice.”233  This 
social goal, and the expectation of tenure that it is said to create, has 
even been held by the Fourth Circuit to rise to the level of a “cus-
 230 See, e.g., Swann v. Gastonia Hous. Auth., 675 F.2d 1342, 1345 (4th Cir. 1982); 
Rushie v. Berland, 502 N.Y.S.2d 359, 361 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986) (applying good cause 
requirement before Section 8 expressly required it); Greenwich Gardens v. Pitt,  
484 N.Y.S.2d 439, 442 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. 1984) (articulating “well settled” view that Sec-
tion 8 tenants are entitled to good cause protection).  Since 1981, 42 U.S.C.  
§ 1437f(d)(1)(B)(ii) has expressly provided for eviction only for good cause. 
 231 Green, 346 A.2d at 697 (citing Appel v. Beyer, 114 Cal. Rptr. 336, 339 (Cal. App. 
Dep’t Super. Ct. 1974)). 
 232 The policy statement reads: 
     The Congress affirms the national goal, as set forth in [the Congres-
sional Declaration of National Housing Policy] of a decent home and a 
suitable living environment for every American family. 
     The Congress finds that this goal has not been fully realized for 
many of the Nation's lower income families; that this is a matter of 
grave national concern; and that there exist in the public and private 
sectors of the economy the resources and capabilities necessary to the 
full realization of this goal. 
     The Congress declares that in the administration of those housing 
programs authorized by this Act which are designed to assist families 
with incomes so low that they could not otherwise decently house 
themselves, and of other Government programs designed to assist in 
the provision of housing for such families, the highest priority and em-
phasis should be given to meeting the housing needs of those families 
for which the national goal has not become a reality; and in the carry-
ing out of such programs there should be the fullest practicable utiliza-
tion of the resources and capabilities of private enterprise and of indi-
vidual self-help techniques. 
Congressional Affirmation of National Goal of Decent Homes and Suitable Living 
Environment for American Families, 12 U.S.C. § 1701t (1968) (adopted as part of 
the Housing and Urban Development Act, Pub. L. No. 90-448, 82 Stat. 476 (1968)). 
 233 McQueen v. Druker, 317 F.Supp. 1122, 1130 (D. Mass. 1970). 
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tom.”234  Under this view, even without an express congressional ar-
ticulation of a good cause eviction requirement, for public and quasi-
public landlords, the requirement would exist nonetheless. 
One can persuasively quibble with the imposition of good cause 
eviction rules even in the public and quasi-public arenas, particularly 
questioning whether they are capable of furthering the goal at which 
they are aimed.235  But their imposition in these domains is at least 
somewhat justifiable.  Where the federal government acts as landlord, 
it should be able to subject itself to restrictive termination provisions, 
as it so desires.  Likewise, when it operates as the de facto landlord 
(though a private person holds title), it should be able to condition 
its provision of assistance upon the imposition of restrictions on ter-
mination, as it so desires. 
B. In the Private Housing Sector 
It is in the market for housing that is entirely private that the in-
vasion of good cause eviction is most disturbing.  And the move to-
ward requiring that even private landlords with no governmental 
connection refrain from evicting their tenants (even after the expira-
tion of a term lease) without some “good cause” has only gained sway 
in the United States over the last one hundred years. 
The groundwork for the American sanctioning of good cause 
eviction requirements in the private market was laid in Block v. 
Hirsh,236 a 1921 decision of  the Supreme Court of the United States.  
In that case, Hirsh, a Washington, D.C. landlord, attempted to evict 
his tenant after the term of the lease had run.237  The tenant, Block, 
argued that eviction was improper, since the District of Columbia 
Rents Act at that time prohibited a landlord from evicting a tenant, 
even when his lease was expired, without other good cause.238  Hirsh 
countered that such a rule would “cut down” his right “to do what he 
will with his own and to make what contracts he pleases.”239
The Supreme Court upheld Block’s right to retain possession of 
the rented premises and rejected landlord Hirsh’s contention that 
the result amounted to an unconstitutional taking.240  The Court justi-
fied its decision by pointing out that the effect of the D.C. Rents Act 
 234 Joy v. Daniels, 479 F.2d 1236, 1241 (4th Cir. 1973). 
 235 See supra Part III. 
 236 256 U.S. 135 (1921). 
 237 Id. at 153. 
 238 Id. at 153–54. 
 239 Id. at 157. 
 240 Id. 
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was a fleeting one.241  The statute was emergency legislation passed in 
the wake of World War I to combat an increasingly stressed rental 
housing market.242  This emergency legislation was only to last two 
years,243 further indicating that it was appropriately aimed at solving 
the post-War housing problems of Washington, D.C.  Hirsh’s interests 
were, therefore, set aside, and his lease to Block presumably perpetu-
ally continued, at least until Hirsh could make out some just cause for 
Block’s eviction. 
1. The Spread of Good Cause Eviction Across America 
Post-Block, good cause eviction requirements took hold in some 
states and municipalities as a set of rules applicable to rental housing 
in general and in still more as a set of special rules applicable only to 
particularly “vulnerable tenants.”  Viewing these jurisdictions to-
gether clearly demonstrates that the good cause eviction require-
ments so prevalent in Europe are making no small gains in the 
United States as well. 
a. The Market for Ordinary Dwellings244
Good cause eviction requirements imposed upon ordinary dwell-
ings in this country have come in a number of forms.  Some exist only 
as a corollary to and enforcer of a scheme of rent control.  Others 
stand alone as default rules applicable to virtually all dwelling places. 
i. Good Cause Eviction as a Corollary to Rent Control 
Although good cause eviction schemes currently exist in a num-
ber of American jurisdictions,245 perhaps the most well-known scheme 
 241 Id. at 154. 
 242 Block, 256 U.S. at 154. 
 243 Id. 
 244 The phrase “ordinary dwelling” is used here in contrast to special dwellings, 
such as mobile homes, discussed supra Part IV.B.1.b. 
 245 See, e.g., Arizona Mobile Home Parks Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1476 (LexisNexis 1975); Arizona Recreational Vehicle Long-
Term Rental Space Act, ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-2143 (LexisNexis 2000); Connecticut 
Mobile Manufactured Homes, CONN. GEN. STAT. § 21-80 (1974); District of Columbia 
Rental Housing Evictions, D.C. CODE § 42-3505.01 (2001); Florida Mobile Home 
Park Lot Tenancies, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 723.061 (West 1984); Massachusetts Local 
Control of Rents and Evictions, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 40 § 1-9 (West 1970); New 
Hampshire Termination of Tenancy, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 540:2 (1985); New Jer-
sey Removal of Residential Tenants, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.1 (West 2000); New 
York Rent Control Act, N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 26-408 (McKinney 1985).  For an ex-
ample of a local ordinance adopting good cause provisions, see Just Cause for Evic-
tion Ordinance, OAKLAND, CAL., O.M.C. § 8.22.3 (2002). 
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hails from New York.  Good cause eviction is in place there to effec-
tuate a scheme of rent control that New York City has had since 
1943.246  The gist of the New York law is that a tenant may not be 
evicted, “notwithstanding the fact that the tenant has no lease or that 
his or her lease . . . has expired or otherwise terminated” absent certain 
statutorily prescribed grounds or until the landlord obtains the nec-
essary “certificate of eviction.”247  Seven grounds for which a landlord 
may evict are then set out, most of them geared toward tenant mis-
conduct.248
The landlord’s rope under this statute is tied tight.  A property 
owner seeking to recover possession for his own use will find himself 
out of luck under the statutorily enumerated grounds.  But the stat-
ute goes on to mandate that the city grant a certificate of eviction 
when it finds that “[t]he landlord seeks in good faith to recover pos-
session of a housing accommodation because of immediate and 
compelling necessity for his or her own personal use and occupancy 
or for the use and occupancy of his or her immediate family.”249
This “good faith” and “immediate and compelling necessity” 
standard was applied to reject the landlord’s eviction request in Bu-
hagiar v. New York State Division of Housing and Community Renewal.250  
Petitioner Buhagiar owned a five-apartment building that she pur-
chased with the intent to occupy.251  She sought an order to evict the 
tenant in a six-bedroom unit of the building so that she and her 
 246 SALINS, supra note 152, at 61; Rent Regulation After 50 Years—An Overview of New 
York State's Rent Regulated Housing, TENANTNET NEWSLETTER 1993, available at http:// 
www.tenant.net/Oversight/50yrRentReg/history.html (describing what was origi-
nally intended as a “temporary emergency measure” as a now “stable fixture” in New 
York, with “1.2 million of New York State’s 3.3 million rental housing accommoda-
tions . . . subject to rent regulation”). 
 247 N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 26-408(a) (McKinney 1985) (emphasis added); see also 
Duell v. Condon, 647 N.E.2d 96, 99 (N.Y. 1995) (even nonsignatory to lease gets pro-
tection of New York good cause eviction scheme). 
 248 N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 26-408(a) (McKinney 1985).  The grounds for eviction 
are: (1) tenant violation of lease obligations; (2) tenant commission of nuisance or 
gross negligence; (3) illegal occupancy; (4) immoral or illegal use; (5) tenant refusal 
to renew upon demand; (6) unreasonable tenant refusal to allow landlord access to 
the rental unit for necessary repairs, improvements, or inspections; or (7) eviction 
under a conversion pursuant to a written eviction plan submitted to the attorney 
general.  Id. 
 249 Id. § 26-408(b)(1).  Such landlord requests are policed with treble damages; if 
a landlord evicts a tenant alleging his own need and then fails to use the premises to 
fulfill that need, the evicted tenant may recover treble damages, plus attorneys’ fees 
and costs.  Id. § 26-408(g)(1)(e). 
 250 525 N.Y.S.2d 202 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988). 
 251 Id. at 202. 
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daughter could personally occupy the space.252  Buhagiar demon-
strated that her living space at the time she sought eviction was 
smaller than the space at issue (albeit by just one room), that she 
paid more in rent for her smaller apartment than her tenants were 
paying, and that she needed a ground floor apartment because of 
medically substantiated knee problems and hypertension.253  Never-
theless, the New York State Division of Housing and Community Re-
newal (DHCR) essentially held that Buhagiar’s living conditions at 
the time she sought the eviction order were “adequate,” and that she 
therefore failed to show the requisite “immediate and compelling ne-
cessity.”254  And while the New York appellate court suggested that 
immediate and compelling necessity may not be restricted to “inade-
quate housing,”255 it affirmed the DHCR’s decision to deny Buhagiar 
the requested eviction certificate.256  The result, of course, was that 
Buhagiar was simply stuck in an undesirable situation, waiting for a 
tenant to voluntarily vacate, or perhaps commit some misconduct, in 
order to take full advantage of her investment. 
Even if a New York landlord can do what Buhagiar could not 
and meet the good faith and compelling need tests, eviction certifi-
cates are unavailable, regardless of landlord need, when the tenant to 
be evicted is at least sixty-two, has lived in the building for at least 
twenty years, or has a permanent medical condition that disables him 
from “gainful employment.”257  The case of Dawson v. Higgins258 brings 
to light the severity of such a rule for the landlord.  Joan Dawson pur-
chased a Manhattan brownstone housing two rent-controlled tenants 
in November of 1983.259  She planned to evict those tenants when 
their leases expired so that she and her adult family members could 
personally occupy the spaces.  But on June 19, 1984, just seven 
months after Dawson purchased the building, the above-described 
provision prohibiting eviction of any tenant who has rented for at 
least twenty years came into effect.260  “The amendment applied to 
‘any tenant in possession at or after the time it [took] effect.’”261  As 
such, the statute applied to preclude Dawson from evicting the long-
 252 Id. 
 253 Id. at 202–04. 
 254 Id. 
 255 Id. at 203–04. 
 256 Buhagiar, 525 N.Y.S.2d at 204. 
 257 N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 26-408(b)(1) (McKinney 1985). 
 258 610 N.Y.S.2d 200 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994). 
 259 Id. at 129. 
 260 Id. at 131. 
 261 Id. 
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standing tenant, even for her own personal use of the brownstone.  
Dawson challenged the provision as an unconstitutional taking and 
lost.262  The New York court noted particularly the wide government 
“latitude in regulating landlord-tenant relations.”263  And though it 
did not explicitly so state, it evidenced a willingness to grant such lati-
tude even when those relations are wholly private. 
The restrictive interpretation of the need standard in Buhagiar, 
and the extreme protection given to longstanding, elderly, or ill ten-
ants by New York statute, serve to explain why the rental housing 
market in New York is such a risky one for prospective investors.  The 
relationship that a party purchasing rental property enters into is an 
inflexible and seemingly perpetual one.  Even if a landlord is not dis-
advantaged by either of these rules, because he does not seek to oc-
cupy the property himself or to evict a needy tenant, he may be oth-
erwise disadvantaged should he try to free himself of his investment.  
A New York landlord may seek an eviction certificate in order to re-
model or demolish the premises,264 but the city is prohibited from 
granting a certificate for such a purpose unless it finds that “there is 
no reasonable possibility that the landlord can make a net annual re-
turn of eight and one-half per centum of the assessed value of the 
subject property.”265  Thus, the New York investor is likely to consider 
long and hard before purchasing rental housing.  Chances are quite 
good that he may never escape the investment. 
ii. Good Cause Eviction as a Default Rule of Tenancy 
Through a 1974 Anti-Eviction Act, the State of New Jersey sub-
jects nearly all tenancy contracts to the requirement that landlords 
refrain from evicting their tenants absent good cause.266  And unlike 
New York, New Jersey’s provisions operate absent rent controls.267  
The New Jersey good cause eviction legislation provides that “no les-
see or tenant . . . may be removed by the Superior Court from any 
house, building, mobile home or land in a mobile home park or 
 262 Id. at 131–32. 
 263 Id. at 132. 
 264 N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 26-408(b)(3)–(4) (McKinney 1985). 
 265 Id. § 26-408(b)(5)(a). 
 266 See generally N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.1 (West 2000). 
 267 See Rabin, supra note 228, at 535.  Similarly, voters in Oakland, California 
adopted a scheme of “just cause” eviction in 2002.  Just Cause for Eviction Ordi-
nance, OAKLAND, CAL., O.M.C. § 8.22.320(6) (2003).  The ordinance that effectuates 
the scheme expressly states that its purpose is to remedy a spike in evictions caused 
by the elimination of rent control.  Id.  Thus, like New Jersey’s rules, the Oakland 
good cause eviction scheme operates independent of rent control.   
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tenement leased for residential purposes . . . except upon establish-
ment of one of [eighteen] grounds as good cause.”268
That there exist eighteen causes for eviction implies that the 
grounds for eviction must be rather broad; it suggests, perhaps, that 
the requirement of proving good cause before evicting may even be 
perfunctory.  A close examination of the enumerated grounds, how-
ever, demonstrates the contrary.  Landlords are well protected 
against tenants that fail to pay rent, commit crimes or gross-
negligence, or otherwise breach the lease in some significant way.269  
But where the New Jersey landlord merely seeks to dwell in the rental 
unit himself, he may find the statute wanting. 
While landlords renting buildings with “three residential units or 
less” need only prove their desire to personally occupy in order to 
evict or refuse renewal to an existing tenant, landlords renting build-
ings with four or more units may not evict for personal need.270  In 
Stamboulos v. McKee,271 the landlord sought to demonstrate the inva-
siveness of this particular provision on landlord rights.  Stamboulos 
purchased a four-unit apartment building partially occupied by 
month-to-month tenants who had been there for a number of 
years.272  On the same day as the transfer of title, Stamboulos gave no-
tice to defendants that their lease was being terminated.273  The no-
tice to quit was given at a time when all that was required of a land-
lord to terminate a month-to-month tenancy in New Jersey was a 
thirty-day notice.274  Twenty-six days after the notice was given—and 
just five days before the lease was to terminate—the New Jersey legis-
lature passed the good cause eviction statute described above.275  Be-
cause Stamboulos’s building contained four units, his desire to per-
sonally occupy the unit was irrelevant; no good cause was 
demonstrated.276  Stamboulos argued that the application of the new 
statute, and its effective deprivation of his right to occupy his own 
building, amounted to an unconstitutional violation of his “funda-
mental property rights.”277
 268 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.1 (West 2000). 
 269 Id. § 2A:18-61.1(c). 
 270 Id. § 2A:18-61.1(l)(1)–(3). 
 271 342 A.2d 529 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975). 
 272 Id. at 530. 
 273 Id. 
 274 Id. 
 275 Id. 
 276 Id. 
 277 Stamboulos, 342 A.2d at 531. 
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The New Jersey appellate court disagreed.  It first held that the 
new statute applied to limit the grounds for which Stamboulos could 
evict his tenant, even though he purchased the building and served 
notice to quit before its passage.278  The court held that before the 
thirty-day notice had run, Stamboulos had no vested right to evict and 
thus there was no problem with applying the new statute to limit him 
to evicting for good cause.279  As to Stamboulos’ substantive objec-
tions, the court noted his argument that the new legislation “in effect 
converts a month-to-month tenancy to a perpetual tenancy, termina-
ble . . . at the will of the tenant,” but only for “good cause” by the 
landlord.280  Nevertheless, the court upheld the statute on constitu-
tional grounds, finding it an appropriate exercise of governmental 
power.281  The legislative history demonstrated that the purpose of 
the statute was to rectify a “critical shortage of rental housing space in 
New Jersey,” and the court apparently found a good cause eviction 
rule an adequate means of addressing that problem.282
The Stamboulos court seemed to recognize the absurdity of the 
statute’s failure to “permit the good faith intention of the landlord to 
occupy the rented premises to serve as a reason for terminating the 
tenancy or obtaining possession.”283  It disclaimed any knowledge of 
“whether this was an oversight or not.”284  Absent an express provision 
in the statute providing good cause for owner desire to occupy, the 
court did not feel it could create such a rule.285
Stamboulos demonstrates well the pitfalls of a good cause scheme 
for the New Jersey landlord.286  He was prevented from making a 
needed use of the property by a statute that did not even exist at the time 
of his investment in the building.  What potential investor would pur-
sue rental property under such a tenant-friendly regime?  In the face 
of recent New Jersey jurisprudence providing that the Anti-Eviction 
Act is to be “construed liberally with all doubts construed in favor of a 
 278 Id. at 531. 
 279 Id. 
 280 Id. at 532. 
 281 Id. at 533. 
 282 Id. at 531. 
 283 Stamboulos, 342 A.2d at 532. 
 284 Id. 
 285 Id. 
 286 Landlords seeking to “occupy” their units for business purposes, rather than as 
a personal residence, have suffered the same fate as Stamboulos.  See, e.g., Gross v. 
Barriosi, 401 A.2d 1127 (Passaic County Ct. 1979); Puttrich v. Smith, 407 A.2d 842 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979). 
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tenant,” the potential landlord’s incentives appear all the more 
bleak.287
New Jersey is certainly not alone among American jurisdictions 
with stand-alone good cause eviction regimes.  Washington, D.C. has 
such a regime, which, like New Jersey’s, operates independent of rent 
control and is exceptionally tenant-friendly.288  The D.C. legislation 
sets out a limited number of reasons for which a landlord may termi-
nate or refuse to renew a tenant’s lease.289  And then, much like 
European law—particularly that of France—it forestalls eviction for 
any reason, including the enumerated “good” causes, in freezing 
weather. 290  Specifically, the statute provides: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, no housing 
provider shall evict a tenant on any day when the National 
Weather Service predicts at 8:00 a.m. that the temperature at the 
National Airport weather station will fall below 32 degrees Fahr-
enheit or 0 degrees Centigrade within the next 24 hours.291
Washington, D.C.’s good cause eviction legislation, like that of 
most jurisdictions, has been interpreted liberally, such that it rather 
substantially restricts the rights of landlords.292  Even seizing mortgagees 
are bound by the D.C. law, and are therefore precluded from evicting 
existing (non-mortgagor) tenants absent good cause.293  Washington 
appellate courts have acknowledged that this application of the good 
cause eviction requirement “tend[s] to depress the value of the prop-
erty,” but they continue to apply the statute to mortgagees nonethe-
less.294
b. “Special” Tenancies 
A surprising number of American states have adopted good 
cause eviction schemes for particular types of tenancy contracts that 
 287 224 Jefferson St. Condo. Assoc. v. Paige, 788 A.2d 296, 302 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 2002). 
 288 See D.C. CODE § 42-3505.01 (2001); see also N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 540:2 (1985) 
(providing for a scheme of good cause eviction in New Hampshire). 
 289 D.C. CODE § 42-3505.01 (2001). 
 290 Compare Law No. 90-449 of May 31, 1990 [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], 
June 2, 1990, p. 6551, art. 21, available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr (follow “Les 
autres textes législatifs et réglementaires” hyperlink), with D.C. CODE § 42-3505.01 
(2001). 
 291 D.C. CODE § 42-3505.01(k) (2001). 
 292 See Adm’r of Veterans Affairs v. Valentine, 490 A.2d 1165, 1168 (D.C. 1985) 
(“eviction restrictions . . . are only a part of a comprehensive legislative scheme to 
protect the rights of tenants and therefore must be construed liberally”). 
 293 Id. 
 294 Id. at 1170. 
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state legislatures typically deem “special,” and thus worthy of hefty 
tenant protection.  The most striking example of such a tenancy is 
that in a mobile home park.  The basic principle of tenant tenure 
provisions in these areas is that owners of mobile home parks may not 
evict mobile home owners—and thereby force them to pick up and 
move their mobile homes to another locale—absent “good cause.”295
Much like good cause eviction requirements imposed upon ten-
ancies in traditional dwellings, good cause eviction schemes adopted 
for mobile home parks are typically passed to alleviate a “major 
shortage of space for mobile homes.”296  The shortage in the mobile 
home context is often much more significant than the shortage of 
rental housing stock in general because many municipalities either 
“exclude mobile homes altogether” or restrict the areas in which they 
may be set up.297  Demand quite often exceeds supply. 
To give mobile home owners (“tenants” in the mobile home 
park) some degree of protection in a landlord-focused market, a 
number of states have turned to good cause eviction rules.  Typically, 
park owners may not evict mobile home owners except for “non-
payment of reasonable rent, continuing violation of reasonable park 
rules, continuing violation of mobile home laws, or change in the use 
of the land.”298  To date, at least twenty states have adopted a good 
cause eviction scheme for mobile home tenants.299
2. The Impact of Good Cause Eviction on American 
Landlords and the Rental Housing Market 
The common thread linking the New York, New Jersey, and 
Washington, D.C. good cause eviction rules for ordinary dwellings 
and the adoption of such schemes for special tenancies is, at base, the 
 295 See generally Thomas Moukawsher, Comment, Mobile Home Parks and Connecti-
cut’s Regulatory Scheme: A Takings Analysis, 17 CONN. L. REV. 811 (1985). 
 296 Id. at 814. 
 297 Id. at 813–14. 
 298 Id. at 817. 
 299 See ALASKA STAT. § 34.03.225 (1976); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1476 (1975); 
CAL. CIV. CODE § 800.71 (West 1990); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 38-12-202 to -203 
(West 1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 21-80 (West 1974); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, 
§§ 7007, 7010A (1971); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 723.061 (West 1984); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 
10, § 9097 (1987); MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 8A-1101 (West 1976); MASS. GEN. 
LAWS ANN. ch. 140, § 32J (West 1950); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 327C.09 (West 1982); N.H. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 205A:3 (1988); N.M. STAT. ANN § 47-10-5 (West 1978); N.Y. REAL 
PROP. LAW § 223 (McKinney 1974); 68 PA. STAT. ANN. § 398.3 (West 1976); R.I. GEN. 
LAWS § 31-44-2 (1956); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 94.201 (Vernon 2002); UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 57-16-4 (1953); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6237 (1973); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 
59.20.080 (West 1977).  But see S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-47-530 (1976) (allowing a landlord 
to evict if rent is not paid within five days of its due date) (emphasis added). 
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implementation of social policy.  Some jurisdictions purport to adopt 
these requirements in an aim to cure housing shortages.300  All justify 
good cause eviction schemes by pointing to “what they perceive as a 
strong public policy in favor of providing decent housing.”301  It is a 
laudable goal, of course. 
The problem is that using a good cause eviction scheme to at-
tempt to effectuate this goal necessarily, and unduly, burdens private 
landlords.  Who should bear the burden of ensuring adequate hous-
ing in this country—the government or private landowners?  New Jer-
sey has clearly recognized this tension and answered that question.  
Its supreme court has held that application of the Anti-Eviction Act 
necessarily means that “landlord rights must to some extent and on 
general welfare grounds defer to the needs of the tenant population 
in [the] state.”302  Most jurisdictions are not so candid about the ef-
fects of a good cause eviction scheme.  They seem to opine that ten-
ants deserve special protection by the law and to conclude that good 
cause eviction requirements are the only—or at least the best—means 
of achieving that protection.  But the cost of the protection to private 
individuals carrying the status of “landlord” is seldom remembered.  
Two private interests are involved, and American states that adopt 
good cause evictions schemes must recognize that in so doing, they 
are impliedly adjudging “that the tenant’s interest in his home and 
the public’s interest in maintaining the supply of rental units are 
more important than the landlord’s investment.”303
The experiences of both the European and American jurisdic-
tions that have adopted good cause evictions schemes should cer-
tainly give a state considering the balance between landlord and ten-
ant rights pause.  Both here and abroad, empirical evidence has 
shown that good cause eviction schemes serve neither to boost rental 
supply nor to bolster its quality.  In fact, precisely the opposite is 
true.304
In the United States, an examination of rent control schemes 
imposed on ordinary dwellings demonstrates the inability of good 
 300 See, e.g., Rea & Gupta, supra note 162, at 105, 108 (noting that rent control, and 
likewise good cause eviction, first gained sway in this country as a response to hous-
ing shortages caused by World War I). 
 301 Salzberg & Zibelman, supra note 15, at 64. 
 302 Franklin Tower One, L.L.C. v. New Mexico, 725 A.2d 1104, 1110 (N.J. 1999). 
 303 Mary Ann Glendon, The Transformation of American Landlord-Tenant Law, 23 
B.C. L. REV. 503, 544 (1982). 
 304 For a discussion of the abysmal long term effects of good cause eviction in 
Sweden and the United Kingdom, for instance, see supra notes 164–69, 173–81 and 
accompanying text. 
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cause eviction rules to remedy housing problems.  Studies of rent 
control schemes with good cause eviction requirements that formerly 
existed in Boston, for example, have demonstrated that the regime’s 
institution promoted a sixty-seven percent drop in construction in the 
private market.305  Other cities saw a boost in construction over that 
same period.306  In New York, rent controlled apartments with a good 
cause eviction requirement are dilapidated much more frequently 
than their non-rent-controlled counterparts—a difference of twenty-
nine to thirty percent.307  The housing situation is so bad in New York 
that one housing policy expert has remarked: 
     One does not have to be an advocate of laissez-faire, nor an 
ideological conservative to remark that when it comes to housing 
in New York, the public sector has done quite enough already.  
Up to now every new increment of public intervention has made 
things worse.  We have taken so many unsuccessful twists and 
turns along the path of well-intentioned tinkering that perhaps it 
is time to test the possibility that generally reasonable incentives 
and disincentives of an unconstrained market might do a better 
job of allocating and conserving the housing stock.308
Even where good cause eviction has stood alone in this country, 
without rent control to boost its effect, it has failed miserably.  Good 
cause eviction schemes in the mobile home context have had near 
disastrous results.  It might have been anticipated—merely through 
the application of basic economic principles—that a good cause evic-
tion regime would do nothing to remedy a supply problem.  Indeed, 
by discouraging landlord investment in a venture that may quickly 
become unprofitable, good cause eviction requirements should have 
been expected to increase problems with supply.  The market evidence 
shows that good cause eviction schemes in mobile home parks have 
done precisely that. 
Connecticut, one of the earlier states to enact a good cause evic-
tion scheme for mobile home park tenants, has seen, in the wake of 
the scheme’s adoption, a proliferation of park closings.309  And even 
beyond supply problems, Connecticut has been forced to confront 
rather serious park owner abuses, exceptionally lengthy delays in evic-
 305 Rea & Gupta, supra note 162, at 128 n.68. 
 306 Id. 
 307 Id. at 129 n.73. 
 308 SALINS, supra note 152, at xix. 
 309 Moukawsher, supra note 295, at 832 n.107. 
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tion proceedings, and a general state of increased animosity among 
landlords and tenants.310
Good cause eviction schemes both for ordinary dwellings and in 
the mobile home park context, then, have wholly failed to meet their 
social and economic goals of protecting tenants by insuring adequate 
housing and rectifying social problems.  The reality is that they have 
decreased both the availability and quality of rental housing. 
V. A GROWING NEED TO RESIST THE INTERNATIONAL MOVEMENT 
Rules restricting a landlord to evicting a tenant or refusing to 
renew his lease for good cause, quite obviously, represent a rather 
substantial intrusion upon private property rights.  Blackstone de-
fined the essence of the right to property as the “free use, enjoyment, 
and disposal of all his acquisitions, without any control or diminu-
tion, save only by the laws of the land.”311  Even at civil law, the right 
of ownership has been defined as an absolute one.312  A property 
owner in any legal system “has an inherent right to control the dispo-
sition of her property as she sees fit.”313  Indeed, most agree that there 
is no concept of ownership divorced from rights of use and abuse.314
Certainly any landowner that enters into a lease is voluntarily re-
stricting his own right of dominion over his land.  But that intrusion 
upon the rights of the landlord should go only as far as his lease 
agreement has permitted.  Lease has always been regarded as a tem-
porary right.315  When the period for which a landlord consented to 
restriction of his use has ended, the landlord’s right to retake the 
property is generally considered unfailing.  The state should not be 
able to change this result without the landowner’s consent, as the 
right to enjoy property and to be free from governmental intrusion 
“is the essence of liberty.”316
Good cause eviction requirements intrude upon the province of 
the landlord in such a fundamental way that they can only be said to 
 310 Id. at 831–32. 
 311 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *139.  Blackstone refused to accept in-
trusion upon private owners’ rights to achieve social goals.  “So great, moreover, is 
the regard of the law for private property, that it will not authorize the least violation 
of it; no, not even for the general good of the whole community.”  Id. 
 312 The essence of property at civil law is that “it is exclusive, that is to say, it con-
sists in the attribution of a thing that to a given person is to the exclusion of all oth-
ers.”  PLANIOL, supra note 149, at 378. 
 313 Salzberg & Zibelman, supra note 15, at 62. 
 314 Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 165 (1921) (McKenna, J., dissenting). 
 315 Id. 
 316 Id. 
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alter the very notion of what it means to hold property.317  “[T]he 
‘sticks in the bundle of rights’ that compose the property interest in a 
leasehold have been reallocated between landlord and tenant” to 
achieve social and economic goals.318  This redistribution is signifi-
cant—it deprives the landlord of some of his most basic rights, in ef-
fect, converting a term tenancy he perfected into something more 
akin to a life estate, terminable at will by the tenant but lasting in 
near perpetuity for the landlord.319  There simply is no theoretical jus-
tification for such a subversion of a property owner’s rights.  The oft-
proffered justification that “tenants are more numerous than land-
lords and that in some way this disproportion . . . makes a tyranny in 
the landlord”320 simply does not withstand critical scrutiny. 
What is perhaps most disturbing about the proliferation of good 
cause eviction requirements is that they seem to utterly fail at meet-
ing their intended goals.  Economically, the schemes are not benefi-
cial.  In the long term, they certainly do not serve to increase rental 
housing supply, which is ironic given that this is the principal reason 
offered for their promulgation.321  Indeed, evidence from Sweden, 
and even closer to home in Connecticut, shows that good cause evic-
tion requirements tend to decrease the rental housing stock.  More-
over, good cause eviction requirements do not appear to make any 
headway in promoting the social goal of decent housing for every in-
dividual.  To the contrary, they serve to lessen the quality of rental 
housing, while simultaneously diminishing its quantity. 
The failure of good cause eviction schemes to even begin to 
remedy housing problems in Europe and in their limited domain in 
the United States just underscores the importance of the recognition 
in this country that good cause eviction must not be further im-
ported.  There is no reason to believe that a scheme which has not 
worked abroad, and has not worked either alone or in combination 
with rent control here, will prove useful. 
Protection of the social right to housing is important, and to 
some extent, the rights of individuals in private property will simply 
have to suffer.  With a homelessness crisis that has by now touched 
 317 This modification to the lease relationship has been described as one “contrary 
to every conception of leases that the world has ever entertained, and of the recipro-
cal rights and obligations of lessor and lessee.”  Id. at 159. 
 318 Glendon, supra note 303, at 544. 
 319 Id. at 543. 
 320 Block, 256 U.S. at 161 (McKenna, J., dissenting). 
 321 “Generally speaking, from a comprehensive perspective, it is the long-term, ef-
ficient functioning of the sector as a whole that is the prime objective of policy.”  
ANGEL, supra note 143, at 295. 
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most parts of the world,322 it is clear that something must be done.  
Governments must aid in insuring their populations the safest and 
best housing possible.  But the dream of Les Enfants de Don Quichotte is 
indeed an impossible one if it is to be remedied through good cause 
eviction schemes.  They are simply not a suitable means of achieving 
that goal. 
The recent spread of the view of housing as a fundamental right 
in Europe cannot help but further permeate American law and soci-
ety.  At least nine countries now recognize the availability of decent 
housing as a basic human right.323  And already, this movement is tak-
ing hold in this country.324  As recently as 2002, voters in Oakland, 
California approved a scheme of good cause eviction with a view to 
protecting the “human right” to “safe, decent, and sanitary hous-
ing.”325  The United States government has likewise detailed the social 
objective of “ensuring ‘a decent home for every family at a price 
within their means.’”326  In the wake of Hurricane Katrina in 2005, the 
State of Louisiana offered incentives to small landlords for repairing 
storm-damaged rental housing in an effort to provide affordable 
rental housing to low income families.327  The view of the right to 
adequate and affordable housing as one which society must ensure to 
all, then, is stronger than ever in the United States.328
The danger here is that we fall into the trap of believing that 
good cause eviction requirements can help us protect this right and 
to meet our social goals on housing.  As we come closer in the United 
States to accepting the burgeoning international social policy on the 
right to housing, the question becomes whether we can possibly stave 
off the flawed international solution to the housing problem.  I argue 
that we must, or face the fate of our foreign counterparts that have 
tried good cause eviction schemes and failed on both economic and 
social fronts.  The intrusion of the scheme must be stopped, lest it 
damage the American housing situation more. 
 322 See HUGHES, supra note 157, at 398. 
 323 See supra note 11. 
 324 See, e.g., W. Dennis Keating, Commentary on Rent Control and the Theory of Ef-
ficient Regulation, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 1223, 1226 (1989) (discussing Epstein, supra 
note 144). 
 325 Just Cause for Eviction Ordinance, OAKLAND, CAL., O.M.C. § 8.22.300 (2003). 
 326 ANGEL, supra note 143, at 15. 
 327 Press Release, Louisiana Recovery Authority, LRA Explains Occupancy Rules 
for Small Rental Property Program: Landlords Warned Against Evicting Tenants in 
Order to Apply for Program (March 13, 2007), available at http://www.lra.louis 
iana.gov/pr031307rental.html.  
 328 See Berger, supra note 5, at 324–25 (proposing that the United States “guaran-
tee” basic housing to all individuals). 
